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NOTES
A Machete for the Patent Thicket:
Using Noerr-Pennington Doctrine’s
Sham Exception to Challenge Abusive
Patent Tactics by Pharmaceutical
Companies
Outrageous drug prices have dominated news coverage of the American
healthcare system for years. Yet despite widespread condemnation of
skyrocketing drug prices, nothing seems to change. Pharmaceutical companies
can raise drug prices with impunity because they hold patents on their drugs,
which give them monopolies. These monopolies are only supposed to last twenty
years, and then competing lower-cost drugs like generics can enter the market,
driving down the costs of pharmaceuticals for all. But pharmaceutical
companies have created “patent thickets,” dense webs of overlapping patents
surrounding one drug, which have artificially extended the companies’
monopolies for years or even decades after a drug’s initial patent expires. These
problems will only be exacerbated as the pharmaceutical industry increasingly
focuses on biologic drugs, which already provide more opportunities to acquire
multiple patents on one drug than traditional small-molecule drugs.
Patent law’s weapons in the fight against patent thickets, namely
litigation and inter partes reviews (an abbreviated process for challenging
patent validity), have proven to be inadequate—a scalpel when the public needs
a machete. Antitrust law, which polices anticompetitive behavior and corrects
market failures, is the ideal weapon to fight the pharmaceutical industry’s
exploitation of patent law. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes
parties from antitrust liability when a party “petitions” the government,
currently stands in the way of an antitrust solution to the patent-thicket
problem. “Petitions” eligible for Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity include
patent applications and patent-infringement lawsuits, so the pharmaceutical
industry can wield the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as a sword against potential
antitrust challenges. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine has a narrow “sham
exception,” where Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity is pierced when a
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party’s petitions are “mere shams” to interfere with the operations of a
competitor. Unfortunately, after two Supreme Court decisions about the sham
exception, the circuit courts have disagreed on the sham exception’s operation,
leaving potential antitrust plaintiffs, such as consumers and government
regulators, with uncertain prospects for challenging patent thickets under
antitrust law.
This Note proposes that courts adopt an approach to reconcile the
Supreme Court decisions wherein courts apply a stricter standard for invoking
the sham exception when an antitrust plaintiff challenges a single sham petition
and a looser standard when an antitrust plaintiff challenges a pattern of sham
petitions. Further, this Note proposes a general framework for analyzing patent
proceedings under the looser pattern standard. This solution strikes a balance
between protecting parties’ First Amendment petitioning right and
discouraging abuse of the patent law system for anticompetitive effect. If
successful, antitrust challenges can lead to quicker market entry for lower-cost
drugs and allow more people to benefit from innovative and life-altering drugs.
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INTRODUCTION
The world’s second-best-selling drug of all time is Humira. 1
Humira can treat a variety of autoimmune conditions, including
rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn’s disease, and plaque psoriasis, among
others. 2 Humira is on track to become and remain the best-selling drug
in history through 2024, with a projected revenue of $240 billion. 3
AbbVie Inc. (“AbbVie”), the company that owns the patents for Humira,
has built its business off Humira’s bounty. 4 In 2019 alone, AbbVie
earned $19.2 billion in worldwide net revenues from Humira, which
accounted for 58% of AbbVie’s total net revenues for that year. 5 AbbVie
achieves these record-busting revenues for Humira not by quantity sold
but by price: Humira’s price doubled in just six years. 6 In 2012, Humira
cost $19,000 a year per patient; by 2018, Humira’s price had reached
1.
The heart drug Lipitor is the current best seller with $164.43 billion in sales through
2018, but years of generic Lipitor competitors have eaten away at Lipitor’s dominance. Angus Liu,
Top 10 All-Star Drugs in 2024: Humira’s Captain, but Who Else Makes the Roster?, FIERCEPHARMA
(Aug. 15, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/top-10-all-time-biggest-sellingdrugs-by-2024#:~:text=Heart [https://perma.cc/QH7H-BW5A]. Humira’s revenue dominance will
end in 2024 because multiple Humira competitors will enter the market throughout 2023. See
infra note 17 (discussing the entrance of Humira competitors in the market).
2.
HUMIRA, https://www.humira.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2021) [https://perma.cc/KC9P4QHZ].
3.
Liu, supra note 1.
4.
See Sy Mukherjee, Protect at All Costs: How the Maker of the World’s Bestselling Drug
Keeps Prices Sky-high, FORTUNE (July 18, 2019, 5:31 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/abbviehumira-drug-costs-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/M89A-MK69] (“Humira isn’t just AbbVie’s
bestselling drug, it is its everything-drug.”). Moreover, AbbVie did not “aggressively pursue the
replenishment of their [product] pipeline,” and its spending on research and development is near
the bottom of the twelve global biopharma companies. Id. AbbVie’s reliance on Humira has come
at a cost to its shareholders: “AbbVie’s stock has plunged more than 27% in the past 12 months,
underperforming most of its peers.” Id.
5.
AbbVie Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 10, 70 (Feb. 21, 2020). Humira also accounted
for 61% of AbbVie’s total net revenues in 2018 and 65% of AbbVie’s total net revenues in 2017. Id.
6.
Danny Hakim, Humira’s Best-Selling Drug Formula: Start at a High Price. Go Higher.,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/business/humira-drug-prices.html
[https://perma.cc/ER3M-BPRX].
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$38,000 a year per patient. 7 Moreover, AbbVie explicitly tied its seniorexecutive bonuses directly to Humira’s net revenue between 2015 and
2018. 8 Within the first year that AbbVie introduced this incentive,
AbbVie implemented the largest price increases in Humira’s history—
a 30% increase over a ten-month period. 9 AbbVie can raise Humira’s
price with impunity because Humira’s many patents prevent generic
competitors 10 from entering the market and putting pressure on
Humira’s price. 11
The original patent for Humira’s active ingredient, an antibody
called “adalimumab,” expired on December 31, 2016. 12 At least four
generic competitors to Humira have been approved by the Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”). 13 Despite these approvals, no generic
competitor has launched in the United States to date. 14 The key to
Humira’s mind-boggling success is AbbVie’s aggressive patent
application and litigation strategy, designed to protect Humira from
competition. 15 AbbVie allegedly filed 247 patent applications on
Humira in the United States alone, obtaining 132 patents. 16 Further,
through its aggressive litigation strategy, AbbVie entered into patentinfringement settlement agreements with rival drug manufacturers to
ensure that no Humira competitor can launch in the United States until
2023. 17
7.
8.

Id.
STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & REFORM, 117TH CONG., REP. ON DRUG PRICING
INVESTIGATION: ABBVIE—HUMIRA AND IMBRUVICA 9 (Comm. Print 2021) [hereinafter DRUG
PRICING INVESTIGATION].
9.
Id.
10. The “generic” competitors to Humira are actually “biosimilars.” See infra Section I.B
(explaining how biosimilars are the closest equivalent to generics for biologic drugs like Humira).
11. See Mukherjee, supra note 4 (noting that “[i]n the U.S., pharma companies can charge
whatever they want for their products” due to patent exclusivity and the lack of regulation on drug
prices).
12. In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
13. Id. at 825.
14. Id. at 824–25.
15. See Mukherjee, supra note 4 (noting that, according to Professor Robin Feldman, “AbbVie
[is] a pioneer—not just in medical treatments but also in legal protections”).
16. In re Humira, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 822. Although AbbVie’s actions with Humira are the
most blatant use of this patent strategy, reports indicate that the “12 top-selling drugs in the U.S.
were protected by an average of 71 patents,” which lengthened the average patent monopoly to
thirty-eight years, or nearly double the statutory patent term. Bryan Koenig, 7th Circ. to Crawl
into Humira ‘Patent Thicket’ Dispute, LAW360 (Feb. 23, 2021, 6:58 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1351485/7th-circ-to-crawl-into-humira-patent-thicket-dispute
[https://perma.cc/X2LG-GYJ2].
17. The earliest potential entrant of a direct Humira competitor is a drug developed by an
AbbVie competitor, Amgen, Inc. (“Amgen”), called Amjevita, which was approved by the FDA in
2016. In re Humira, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 824. According to the terms of Amgen’s patent infringement
settlement agreement with AbbVie, Amjevita will launch in the United States in January 2023.
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In 2019, the largest grocery union in New York and other
indirect purchasers of Humira filed twelve class-action lawsuits against
AbbVie in federal district court. 18 The district court consolidated these
lawsuits into In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litigation. 19 The
plaintiffs alleged that AbbVie’s amassing of an impenetrable “patent
thicket” prevented competitors from challenging Humira’s dominance,
which constituted a violation of federal antitrust law. 20 A patent thicket
can be understood as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights that a company must hack its way through in order to actually
commercialize new technology.” 21 AbbVie allegedly uses its patent
thicket to keep artificially extending Humira’s patent exclusivity (and,
therefore, AbbVie’s ability to keep raising prices). 22 The patent thicket
has the added bonus of discouraging any potential Humira competitors
from challenging Humira’s patents because of the sheer amount of
patents challengers would need to invalidate. 23
In June 2020, the district court granted AbbVie’s motion to
dismiss the class-action complaint. 24 The court held that the NoerrPennington doctrine immunized AbbVie from antitrust liability, even if
AbbVie obtained and litigated its massive patent portfolio in bad faith. 25
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, derived from the First Amendment
right to petition, established that courts will immunize parties from
antitrust liability for “petitioning” (requesting action from) the
government, even when the petitioners intended their actions to have
anticompetitive effects. 26 Noerr-Pennington petitioning activity can
Id. The settlement agreements with the other manufacturers provide for entry dates ranging from
June 30, 2023 to December 15, 2023. Id.
18. Nadia Dreid, Humira Buyers Say They’ve Proven AbbVie’s ‘Patent Thicket,’ LAW360 (Nov.
25, 2019, 9:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1223265 [https://perma.cc/ZAR3-GXDP]; Jeff
Overley, AbbVie Faces 1st Antitrust Suit over Humira ‘Patent Thicket,’ LAW360 (Mar. 18, 2019,
11:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1140272 [https://perma.cc/TV42-5VHU].
19. Dreid, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Jeffrey Wu & Claire Wan-Chiung Cheng, Into the Woods: A Biologic Patent Thicket
Analysis, 19 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 93, 109 (2020) (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the
Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001)).
22. See In re Humira, 465 F. Supp. at 827 (“AbbVie was able to delay its competitors and
avoid any real examination of the patents’ validity long enough to reap a few more years’ worth of
monopoly profit on its lucrative, patent-protected product, Humira.”).
23. See id. at 826 (“[Humira competitors said] they had to enter into the settlement
agreements because their only other choices were years of expensive litigation over an impassable
patent thicket or an at-risk launch likely to result in a hefty damages award.”).
24. Id. at 853.
25. Id. at 830.
26. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing citizens the right “to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERRPENNINGTON DOCTRINE 3 (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ftc-
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include applying for patents, obtaining patents, and filing patentinfringement suits to enforce patents because all of those actions are
requests from a party (here, pharmaceutical companies) for the
government to perform some action. 27 Thus, the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine provides patent seekers and patent holders with strong
protection from antitrust liability for patent-related activities.
Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity can be pierced, but the
only explicitly recognized exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is
the narrow “sham exception.” 28 The sham exception eliminates NoerrPennington antitrust immunity in cases where petitioning is a “mere
sham” to interfere with the operations of a competitor. 29 As
demonstrated by In re Humira, however, the sham exception can be
almost impossible to invoke in practice. In that case, the court held that
the plaintiffs could not invoke the sham exception because AbbVie’s
activities were not “objectively baseless.” 30
Two Supreme Court cases, California Motor Transport Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited 31 and Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v.
Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”), 32 created more challenges
for parties trying to invoke the sham exception. California Motor and
PRE proffered different standards for determining whether petitioning
is a “mere sham.” California Motor analyzed a series of proceedings and
defined sham petitions as “a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims” filed
“regardless of the merits of the cases.” 33 PRE, on the other hand,
involved a single lawsuit and formulated a two-part test with an
extremely high bar for successfully invoking the sham exception. 34
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the seemingly conflicting
holdings of California Motor and PRE. In USS-Posco Industries v.
Contra Costa County Building & Construction Trades Council (“Posco”),
the Ninth Circuit held that California Motor and PRE could be
reconciled because they apply in two different situations. 35 The court
staff-report-concerning-enforcement-perspectives-noerr-penningtondoctrine/p013518enfperspectnoerr-penningtondoctrine.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5TXL-V2G9]
(explaining the origins of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine).
27. See infra text accompanying note 150 (noting that California Motor extended NoerrPennington protection to administrative and judicial proceedings).
28. Michael Pemstein, The Basis for Noerr-Pennington Immunity: An Argument that Federal
Antitrust Law, Not the First Amendment, Defines the Boundaries of Noerr-Pennington, 40 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 79, 87 (2014).
29. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 26, at 35.
30. In re Humira, 465 F. Supp. 3d at 830.
31. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
32. 508 U.S. 49 (1993).
33. 404 U.S. at 512–13.
34. 508 U.S. at 52–54, 60–61.
35. 31 F.3d 800, 810 (9th Cir. 1994).
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reasoned that PRE’s exacting standard applied only to cases like PRE,
where a single sham petition was at issue. 36 California Motor, on the
other hand, applied in cases where there was an alleged pattern of sham
petitions. 37 The Second, 38 Third, 39 and Fourth 40 Circuits all adopted
similar reasoning to Posco in reconciling California Motor and PRE. But
the First 41 and Seventh 42 Circuits reasoned that the PRE two-part test
applied in cases with both single and multiple petitions. The Supreme
Court has yet to grant certiorari on this issue to decide the circuit split.
This Note proceeds in three parts. First, Part I summarizes the
salient elements of patent law, including patent applications, inter
partes reviews (an abbreviated process that allows third parties to
challenge the validity of previously issued patents), 43 and patentinfringement litigation and settlement agreements. Next, Part I
discusses how the pharmaceutical industry’s shift to developing biologic
drugs such as Humira makes the possibility of patent abuse more
prevalent. Finally, Part I outlines the evolution of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine and the sham exception. Part II analyzes the circuit split
around the reconciliation of California Motor and PRE and considers
the benefits and drawbacks to each side. Part III proposes that the
Court adopt the position of the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits in analyzing the sham exception, with some general
modifications. Part III further proposes a framework for analyzing
proceedings specific to patent law under California Motor’s sham
exception pattern analysis. The combination of these proposals will
allow government regulators and consumers to hack through the patent
thickets, which enable skyrocketing drug prices.
I. FROM ANTITRUST, TO BIOLOGICS, TO PATENT LAW
Both antitrust law and patent law seek to promote innovation
but in very different ways. Antitrust law protects and promotes
competition, and vigorous competition in turn spurs companies to
innovate so as to maintain or reach new customers, thereby improving

36. Id. at 810–11.
37. Id. at 811.
38. Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2000).
39. Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2015).
40. Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 27, 728 F.3d 354 (4th
Cir. 2013).
41. P.R. Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC, 874 F.3d 767, 770 (1st Cir. 2017).
42. U.S. Futures Exch., LLC v. Bd. of Trade, 953 F.3d 955, 964 (7th Cir. 2020).
43. Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter Partes Review, Covered Business Method Review, and
Post-Grant Review before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 24 FED. CIR. BAR J. 1, 1 (2014).
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their market share. 44 Alternatively, patent law provides incentives to
develop innovative technology by providing a limited monopoly to
inventors in exchange for disclosure of their inventions to the public. 45
Antitrust and patent law present a paradox because “[a]ctivity that may
be encouraged under the patent system frequently raises the suspicion
of the antitrust laws by reducing competition.” 46 The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine operates at the intersection of patent and antitrust law by
providing antitrust immunity for those petitioning the government to
obtain or enforce patents. 47
The combination of Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity with
existing patent law protections, however, has created a perfect cocktail
for exploitation. Pharmaceutical companies reap immense profits
through increasingly complex patent strategies, such as by creating
impenetrable “patent thickets” around one drug to artificially extend
their monopolies (and continue raising prices). Finding a way to pierce
Noerr-Pennington immunity when these tactics have been used is the
ideal solution for holding pharmaceutical companies accountable and
for creating a pathway to more affordable drugs (absent federal
legislation on drug pricing).
Antitrust law is better equipped to fight patent thickets because
of who leads the battle. In antitrust suits, plaintiffs, who can be
consumers or government regulators, are more likely to continue
fighting patent thickets. 48 Consumers and regulators use antitrust
litigation to obtain court orders or settlements allowing competitors
earlier market entry, in turn significantly driving down consumer drug
prices. In contrast, rival pharmaceutical manufacturers who could
bring patent proceedings either may be unwilling to enter the fight due
to the risk or may concede early in favor of a settlement. 49 Rival
pharmaceutical manufacturers essentially face a collective action
problem in patent proceedings. 50 If one pharmaceutical competitor
wants to fight the patent thicket while the other competitors settle, that

44. Giulio Federico, Fiona Scott Morton & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming
and Protecting Disruption, 20 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 125, 125–26 (2020).
45. W. Nicholson Price II, The Cost of Novelty, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 769, 771 (2020).
46. Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 769
(2002).
47. James R. Atwood, Securing and Enforcing Patents: The Role of Noerr/Pennington, 83 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 651, 652–53 (2001).
48. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 170.
49. Id. at 166–67.
50. Brian J. Love, Shawn P. Miller & Shawn Ambwani, Determinants of Patent Quality:
Evidence from Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 94 (2019).
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competitor bears the entire burden of litigation cost and risk. 51 On the
other hand, a patent challenge win, which invalidates a patent, would
enable all competitors to enter the market early. 52 Thus, the interests
of consumers and the rival pharmaceutical manufacturers do not align,
necessitating the use of antitrust intervention to hack through patent
thickets. 53
This Part will discuss key concepts in patent law and antitrust
law as well as issues specific to the pharmaceutical industry. This
background will illustrate how patent law and the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine enable the proliferation of pharmaceutical patent thickets
while simultaneously presenting significant obstacles in clearing these
thickets. Section A will provide a primer on basic patent law concepts,
including patent duration, patent applications, patent prosecutions,
inter partes reviews (“IPR”), patent infringement litigation, reverse
payment settlements, and patent thickets. Section B will then explain
the unique issues of biologic drugs that exacerbate the problems in
patent law. Finally, Sections C and D will discuss the evolution of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the operation of the sham exception,
respectively.
A. A Primer on Patent Law and Pharmaceutical Concerns
As noted above, patent law both incentivizes the creation of
patent thickets and grants patent holders strong protection against
invalidation of the patents in a thicket. This section illustrates the
aspects of patent law that make amassing patent thickets easier than
invalidating even one invalidly granted patent.
1. Patent Applications and Patent Prosecution
Patent law developed to promote innovation, but innovation’s
goal is not to simply promote what is “new” but to promote what is
“better” or, in other words, to provide a social benefit. 54 Unfortunately,
patent law currently incentivizes “new” technology without
51. Id.; see Zachary Silbersher, What Are the Lessons from Boehringer’s Settlement with
AbbVie
over
its
Humira
Biosimilar?,
MARKMAN ADVISORS
(May
17,
2019),
https://www.markmanadvisors.com/blog/2019/5/17/what-are-the-lessons-from-boehringerssettlement-with-abbvie-over-its-humira-biosimilar [https://perma.cc/W5S6-ASW5] (explaining the
risks of pursuing patent litigation by noting that if a rival “lost that challenge, then it might [be]
boxed out from entering [the market] until all the patents expire,” which could be several years
after the settling competitors were able to enter the market).
52. Love et al., supra note 50, at 94.
53. Silbersher, supra note 51.
54. Price II, supra note 45, at 771.
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emphasizing “better” technology or increasing welfare. 55 In fact, patent
law may even incentivize “negative innovation” in the pharmaceutical
industry. 56 Negative innovation is where patent law actually
incentivizes pharmaceutical companies to bring products to market
that can be affirmatively harmful to patients. 57 One particularly
egregious example involves the drug Imbruvica (also owned by
AbbVie). 58 Imbruvica is an anticancer agent, which means that it is
toxic by design (to kill the cancer), and AbbVie’s recommended dosage
was 2.4 times higher than what was needed to achieve its therapeutic
effect. 59 The recommended dosage was so high was because the Patent
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) rejected the lower dosages in the patent
application as “obvious” and therefore unpatentable; the PTO would
only grant patents for the higher doses. 60 Therefore, patent law actually
created the incentive “to pursue a higher, more toxic dose rather than
the lower doses the FDA suggested be explored.” 61 Patent law
incentives combine with inefficient markets to encourage a proliferation
of pharmaceutical patents for “new” drugs, not necessarily “better”
drugs. 62
Negative innovation is not the only market failure that patent
law causes. In the United States, patents can be obtained by anyone
who “invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof” and follows the statutory procedures. 63 Once the
government grants the patent, the patent owner has exclusive rights to
make, use, or sell the invention in the United States for a term of twenty
years from the application filing date. 64 The value of the patent arises
55. Id.
56. Robin C. Feldman, David A. Hyman, W. Nicholson Price II & Mark J. Ratain, Negative
Innovation: When Patents Are Bad for Patients, 39 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 914, 914 (2021).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 915.
61. Id.
62. “New” here includes minor tweaks to existing drugs which receive patents. These minor
tweaks constitute “new” technology but do not necessarily improve results for patients. For
example, to avoid losing its monopoly on Prilosec at the end of its original patent term, AstraZeneca
isolated one molecule from Prilosec’s mixture, obtained a patent, and received FDA approval in
the form of Nexium. Id. at 801–02. Nexium has been tremendously profitable for AstraZeneca but
has not shown significant therapeutic benefit over Prilosec. Id.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
64. Note that the patent term starts from the date of application and not the date the patent
is issued. For example, if the PTO issues a patent three years after an application was filed, then
that patent owner effectively has a shorter term—seventeen years instead of twenty years. 35
U.S.C. § 154. This timing is particularly important in the pharmaceutical context because lengthy
FDA approval processes can cut a pharmaceutical patent’s effective term shorter still. For
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precisely from this period of exclusivity: the patent owner can charge
extremely high prices while no competitors can enter the market. 65 Of
course, patents have no inherent value if there is no market demand for
the underlying invention, which means that “[p]atent law relies on the
market to sort out the value of inventions.” 66 Markets significantly
underperform, however, when choosing superior pharmaceutical
technologies because “[e]fficient markets require informed consumers
who can choose goods.” 67 Because pharmaceutical consumption is split
among patients, doctors, and insurers and these consumers lack quality
information, pharmaceutical markets cannot perform efficiently. 68
Thus, markets cannot remedy the problem of patent law’s perverse
incentives for pharmaceuticals.
Further study of the patent process reveals more problems. The
process to obtain a patent, called patent prosecution, continues to skew
incentives for patent seekers. Patent prosecution is ex parte, or not
adversarial, and the applicant owes a “duty of candor and good faith” to
the PTO during patent prosecution. 69 Each individual involved in the
patent prosecution must disclose “all information known to that
individual to be material to patentability.” 70 Notwithstanding this
“duty of candor and good faith,” patent applicants in the United States
can restart the patent-prosecution process by filing a continuation
application or a request for continued examination (“RCE”). 71 While
continuation applications and RCEs operate slightly differently, both
processes give the inventor another chance to mature their patent
application into a fully issued patent. 72 For ease of discussion, this Note
instance, until the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted, the average effective patent life of a smallmolecule drug was only eight years. Henry Grabowski & John Vernon, Longer Patents for
Increased Generic Competition in the US: The Waxman-Hatch Act After One Decade, 10
PHARMACOECONOMICS 110 (1996); Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, Biologics: The New
Antitrust Frontier, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2018).
65. Erika Lietzan & Kristina M.L. Acri née Lybecker, Distorted Drug Patents, 95 WASH. L.
REV. 1317, 1319–21 (2020).
66. Price II, supra note 45, at 772.
67. Id. at 773.
68. Id. There are two main causes of inefficient markets for pharmaceutical patents. First,
“patients, doctors, and insurers split the consumer functions of selecting, paying for, and benefiting
from goods,” and each player has divergent incentives. Id. Second, information about various
pharmaceuticals’ quality is “frequently poor or unavailable.” Id.
69. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2021); see also Atwood, supra note 47, at 652 (“The ex parte nature of
the patent-application process, and the powerful legal weapons given to an inventor once a patent
issues, can make the PTO and the federal courts unwitting participants in powerfully
anticompetitive schemes.”).
70. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
71. The fact that the PTO can never truly reject an application is unique to the United States.
Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant
Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 625 (2015).
72. Id.
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will refer to continuation applications and RCEs collectively as
“continuations.” There is currently no limit on how many continuations
an inventor can file. 73 With no means to limit continuations, the only
way for the PTO to reduce its crushing workload is by granting
patents. 74 Generally speaking, as long as an inventor pursues a patent
application long enough, at least one patent will be issued. 75
Continuations also grow patent thickets because they allow
pharmaceutical companies to obtain multiple derivative patents with
only minor distinctions from the original patent. 76 While the PTO can
object when it believes a patent seeker is seeking a “double patent” on
already patented (or patent-pending) inventions, the patent seeker can
“cure” the PTO objection by filing a “terminal disclaimer.” 77 A terminal
disclaimer means “that all the purportedly ‘double patents’ will expire
at the same time,” so the patent holder cannot extend the patent term
with these double patents. 78 For instance, one analysis noted that
AbbVie had eight formulation patents with terminal disclaimers or, in
other words, eight patents derived from a single patent with a single
expiration date. 79 The problem for competitors seeking to invalidate
these eight patents is that the competitor must individually fight each
patent because the invalidation of one does not affect the validity of the
others. 80 Each derivative patent with a terminal disclaimer ensures
that a competitor will need to expend more time and money to fight the
patent thicket, with greater risk. 81
Growing patent thickets through multiple patent applications
and continuations is not cheap, of course, and a conservative estimate

73. Id. at 626.
74. See id. at 616 (“[T]he [PTO] currently faces a crushing backlog of over 600,000 patent
applications, of which close to forty percent constitute repeat filings . . . . [T]he PTO could attempt
to decrease the incentives of applicants to file repeat applications (and hence concomitantly
decrease its backlog of applications) by biasing its grant rate upward.”).
75. Love et al., supra note 50, at 89–90. In fact, about 75% of all patent applications
eventually result in at least one patent. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a
Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 182 (2008).
76. Zachary Silbersher, Why Was the Humira “Patent Thicket” Antitrust Case Against AbbVie
ADVISORS
(June
10,
2020),
Dismissed?,
MARKMAN
https://www.markmanadvisors.com/blog/2020/6/10/why-was-the-humira-patent-thicket-antitrustcase-against-abbvie-dismissed [https://perma.cc/VC9G-HR83].
77. Silbersher, supra note 51.
78. Id.
79. Id. It should be noted that the eight formulation patents with terminal disclaimers are
by no means the only overlapping patents in Humira’s patent thicket. In fact, AbbVie’s 132 patents
can be traced back to just twenty root patents. In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465
F. Supp. 3d 811, 823 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
80. Silbersher, supra note 51.
81. Id.
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of the cost per patent is $100,000. 82 The seeds sown by these patents,
however, grow into a magnificent harvest for pharmaceutical
companies like AbbVie. Even assuming that AbbVie spent twice the
conservative estimate, or $200,000, for each of its 247 patent
applications, AbbVie would have spent just under $50 million on
growing its patent thicket. 83 Fifty million dollars is an enormous
amount of money, but for AbbVie, who made $19.2 billion in worldwide
net revenues from Humira in 2019 alone, $50 million is a drop in the
bucket. 84 For pharmaceutical companies like AbbVie, spending millions
to reap billions of profit on drugs like Humira is well worth the
investment.
2. Inter Partes Reviews
While the previous section discussed how pharmaceutical
companies can acquire numerous patents, this section and the next
section discuss the tools patent law provides to invalidate patents that
should not have been granted. The first method of invalidating patents
is the inter partes review or IPR. Congress grew concerned that the
PTO was granting “too many invalid patents that unnecessarily drain
consumer welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract
rents from innovators” because the PTO could never fully reject the
unlimited continuations that applicants could file. 85 To combat these
concerns, Congress enacted the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in
2011, which created IPRs—a faster and cheaper alternative to patent
litigation. 86 IPRs allow a third party (the “petitioner”) to challenge the
validity of previously issued patents in fast-tracked proceedings before
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”). 87 Because the proceedings

82. Id.
83. See supra text accompanying note 16 (discussing AbbVie’s patent portfolio).
84. See supra text accompanying note 5 (discussing revenues from Humira). While AbbVie
could argue that not all pharmaceutical patents end up creating blockbuster drugs like Humira
and the cost of patent applications could just be sunk costs, that argument does not hold water.
The PTO issued more than 90% of Humira’s U.S. patents after 2014, when Humira had already
been on the market for twelve years. In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d
811, 822 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
85. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 71, at 615; see also Cohen, supra note 43, at 3
(“Congress’s intent was to provide a ‘faster, less costly alternative [ ] to civil litigation to challenge
patents.’ ”).
86. Cohen, supra note 43, at 1.
87. To begin the process, the petitioner files a petition to institute the IPR and pays the
required fees. 35 U.S.C. § 311. The minimum required fees for an IPR consist of an initial request
fee of $19,000 and another fee of $22,500 if the proceeding is instituted. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15 (2021).
If more than twenty claims are being challenged, there are additional fees. Id. By statute, an IPR
lasts a maximum of eighteen to twenty-four months. Joseph W. Dubis, Note, Inter Partes Review:
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are fast-tracked, petitioners can only challenge a patent on some (not
all) invalidity grounds. 88
IPRs have two critical junctures: institution and final written
decision. The PTAB’s “institution” decision is a non-appealable,
intermediate decision issued within six months of the initial IPR
filing. 89 The institution decision hinges on whether the PTAB believes
the petitioner has “a reasonable likelihood” of prevailing on at least one
claim. 90 If the PTAB “institutes” the claim, the IPR will continue to
reach a final written decision on the validity of the patent claims. 91
The institution decision has become the most critical step of the
IPR. 92 Once the PTAB institutes an IPR proceeding, the PTAB’s final
determination will result in cancellation of all instituted claims about
70% of the time. 93 Congress intended IPRs to be a faster and cheaper
way than litigation for companies to invalidate patents, but IPRs have
become a victim of their own success. The high “kill rate” of instituted
claims caused one former Federal Circuit judge to lament that the
PTAB was “acting as [a] death squad[ ], killing property rights.” 94 The
PTAB responded to the criticism of IPRs by decreasing the rate of
institutions, even declining institutions in cases where the petitioner
satisfied all statutory requirements. 95 These concerns belie the fact that
IPRs work exactly as Congress designed—”targeting patents with
indicia of relatively low quality” and invalidating patents that should
never have been granted in the first place. 96

A Multi-Method Comparison for Challenging Patent Validity, 6 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 107,
110, 120 (2015).
88. Petitioners can challenge a patent “for lack of novelty, or as obvious in light of prior
patents or other ‘printed publications.’ ” Love et al., supra note 50, at 99. In order to challenge a
patent on other possible invalidity grounds, a petitioner would need to go through district court
litigation instead. Id.
89. Cohen, supra note 43, at 8.
90. Dubis, supra note 87, at 116 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)); Cohen, supra note 43, at 8.
91. 35 U.S.C. § 318(a).
92. Love et al., supra note 50, at 108.
93. Id. at 104.
94. Id. In fact, the assumption that patent claims will be cancelled after an institution
decision is “often sufficient to destroy the majority of a claim’s licensing value.” Id. at 104, 108. But
see Dubis, supra note 87, at 145 (“[T]he invalidation rates in [IPRs] are no worse than in . . . patent
litigation. If anything, the invalidation rates for [IPRs] may be more favorable to the patent owner
than in the previously available [version of IPRs].”).
95. See Dubis, supra note 87, at 144 (“[IPRs] were initially instituted at a rate of 96 percent
but have subsequently subsided to approximately 78 percent.”); Joel D. Sayres & Reid E. Dodge,
Unfettered Discretion: A Closer Look at the Board’s Discretion to Deny Institution, 19 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 536, 538 (2020) (“[T]he [PTAB] has increasingly identified circumstances in which
it will not institute IPR, even where a petitioner satisfies the statutory threshold for institution
set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) . . . .”).
96. Love et al., supra note 50, at 164.
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3. Patent-Infringement Litigation and Reverse-Payment Settlements
In contrast to IPRs, patent challengers (or potential infringers)
have a much harder road to invalidate patents through litigation.
Patent-infringement litigation is generally lengthier and more
expensive than IPRs. Patent litigation typically takes about 2.7 years
and can range from $500,000 to $3 million compared to an IPR’s twoyear and $250,000 median cost. 97 Moreover, courts presume the validity
of the patents in question, and challengers must prove their case with
clear and convincing evidence. 98 The fact that most IPR petitions are
filed defensively shows that patent-litigation defendants often turn to
IPRs as a cheaper alternative to litigation. 99
Due to the complex, lengthy, and costly nature of patent
litigation, parties often settle such litigation before a court can reach a
final decision on the merits. 100 While the judicial process often favors
settlements, the pharmaceutical industry has pioneered reversepayment settlements to help extend their monopolies. 101 Reversepayment patent settlements (also called pay-for-delays) involve brandname drug manufacturers settling patent-infringement suits with the
alleged infringers—generic or biosimilar drug manufacturers. 102 These
settlements result in brand-name drug manufacturers paying a fee to
the alleged infringers in return for the infringers staying out of the
market for a certain time period. 103 This “reverses” the typical direction
of settlement payments, where the infringer would normally have to
pay a fee to the patentee. 104 In essence, reverse-payment settlements
involve the patent owner paying a kickback to its competitors from its
increased monopoly profits to ensure the extension of its monopoly. 105
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of pharmaceutical
reverse-payment settlements in the landmark decision FTC v. Actavis,
97. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 149; Jonathan H. Ashtor, Opening Pandora’s Box:
Analyzing the Complexity of U.S. Patent Litigation, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 217, 223, 227 (2016);
Dubis, supra note 87, at 120.
98. Cohen, supra note 43, at 15; see 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (establishing the presumption of
validity and that the party seeking to invalidate a patent has the burden of proof).
99. See Dubis, supra note 87, at 143 (noting that 90% of IPR filers were involved in concurrent
litigation and that IPRs became “an intermediate proceeding of the overall litigation”).
100. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 281, 293 (2011) (noting that about 80% of patent suits are settled).
101. Robin C. Feldman & Prianka Misra, The Fatal Attraction of Pay for Delay, 18 CHI. KENT
J. INTELL. PROP. 249, 250 (2019).
102. Id. at 249.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. A. Paul Heeringa, Dodging Antitrust Bullets in Patent Settlement Agreements: Lessons
Learned from the “Reverse Payment” Dilemma, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 265, 273 (2007).
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Inc. 106 In Actavis, the Court rejected the premise that patent rights are
immune from antitrust scrutiny. 107 The Court held that pharmaceutical
reverse-payment settlement agreements can violate antitrust laws. 108
In so holding, the Court concluded that reverse payments have
potential anticompetitive effects because the patent owner is
purchasing the right that it already claims to have but would lose if the
patent were held invalid or not infringed upon by the generic
manufacturer. 109 The Court declined to make reverse-payment
settlement agreements per se unlawful, however, preferring instead to
subject them to antitrust law’s more comprehensive “rule of reason”
analysis. 110 Thus, in Actavis, the Court struck a balance between
anticompetitive concerns and allowing the pharmaceutical industry
autonomy to structure its settlements as it wished. Even reversepayment settlements are available if the parties are willing to take on
risk of antitrust liability. Ultimately, the patent owner and challenger
both benefit from these reverse-payment settlements—but the
consumer loses by having to pay higher drug prices for a longer
period. 111
4. Patent Thickets
As mentioned earlier, pharmaceutical companies often use
“patent thickets” to extend patent monopolies on their drugs past the
initial expiration of the patents. 112 A company creates a patent thicket
when it obtains “multiple patents that cover a single product or

106. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
107. See id. at 141 (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that reverse-payment settlements
were “immune from antitrust attack so long as [their] anticompetitive effects fall within the scope
of the exclusionary potential of the patent”).
108. Id. at 147.
109. Id. at 153–54.
110. Id. at 158–59. Antitrust law’s “rule of reason” is a flexible standard that follows from the
idea that, although some business conduct might technically be a “restraint of trade” and thus a
violation of the Sherman Act, Congress only intended to penalize “unreasonable” restraints of
trade. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 85 (2018) (describing the
origins of the “rule of reason”). Otherwise, the Sherman Act would outlaw all ordinary business
contracts because each contract is technically a restraint of trade, no matter how small. Id.
Therefore, the rule of reason is a fact-intensive inquiry into “a restraint’s overall competitive
effect,” market circumstances, and a general cost-benefit analysis of the restraint in question.
Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375,
1379 (2009).
111. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 154.
112. An interrelated concept is that of “evergreening.” Evergreening involves a pharmaceutical
company obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of a drug in order to extend
market exclusivity of the drug. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 109–10. Patent thickets and
evergreening often go hand-in-hand, but, for simplicity, this Note will only refer to patent thickets.
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technology.” 113 In more visual terms, a patent thicket is a “dense web of
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its
way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” 114
Patent thickets can be so effective at deterring competition
because the sheer number of patents in a patent thicket makes any kind
of litigation too risky for the challenger. As noted in Section I.A.1,
pharmaceutical companies can obtain multiple patents with only slight
variations, stemming from just one patent, but competitors must
challenge each patent individually in IPRs or patent litigation. 115
Invalidity of one patent does not invalidate the others. 116 Further, if
even one patent claim survives the litigation and is ruled as infringed,
then the patent owner can seek injunctive relief to stop competitors’
sale of biosimilars. 117 In addition, the potential monetary damages can
be so high that competitors will not risk patent infringement. For
instance, after a federal judge affirmed a patent-validity ruling in favor
of one pharmaceutical patent holder, the competitor that challenged the
patent had to pay a $1.6 billion settlement. 118 Thus, the extreme
monetary risk that pharmaceutical competitors face with patent
thickets deters rational companies from challenging patent thickets.
Finally, if a competitor does decide to fight a patent thicket, the
cost to clear a patent thicket (even excluding the damages discussed
above) can be prohibitively expensive. Even the allegedly lower cost IPR
for invalidating patents has a median cost of $250,000 for a single IPR
final decision. 119 As an example, assuming Humira had ninety-two core
patents at its peak and each IPR decision cost the median price, a
patent challenger would have to spend $23 million and prevail on every
decision to be able to enter the market. 120 At the same time, if the
competitor actually prevails and invalidates some or all of the patents,
113. Id. at 109 (quoting Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 863, 864 (2007)). But see Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent
Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 166–67 (2011) (describing a
patent thicket as multiple patents covering a single product or technology being owned by different
companies). This Note will be using the definition of “patent thickets” that describes one company
obtaining multiple patents for a single technology.
114. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 109 (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY
119, 120 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2001)).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 76, 80–81.
116. See id.
117. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 148. See In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465
F. Supp. 3d 811, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“[I]t only takes one valid, infringed patent to render all the
rest—whether invalid, infringed, or not—irrelevant for purposes of cause-in-fact analysis.”).
118. See Uri Y. Hacohen, Evergreening at Risk, 33 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 479, 481 (2020)
(describing Teva Pharmaceutical’s patent infringement settlement, which favored Pfizer).
119. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 149.
120. Id.
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the patent holder never has to disgorge their monopoly profits from the
invalid patents even if they could have or should have known that such
patents were invalid. 121 Thus, the patent holder has every incentive to
obtain as many patents as it can to deter would-be competitors and to
extend the timeframe of any litigation challenging its patents. Each day
that courts do not deem a pharmaceutical company’s patents invalid is
another day the pharmaceutical company can reap more monopoly
profits with no risk of disgorgement.
B. Biologic Drugs and Biosimilars: The Future of Medicine
The potential abuses of the patent system described above have
only worsened with the changing technology of the pharmaceutical
industry. Most early twentieth-century pharmaceuticals were smallmolecule drugs created from chemical compounds. 122 Once the active
ingredient in a small-molecule drug was identified, the drug could be
easily synthesized in a variety of ways. 123 This fact made the creation
of low-cost generic versions possible once the initial patents on the
brand-name small-molecule drug expired. 124 The development of
generic versions of small-molecule drugs could cost about $2 million. 125
While the pharmaceutical industry began its abusive patent practices
during the small-molecule drug era, these practices accelerated with
the advent of more complex biologic drugs in the late twentieth century.
Biologics, short for biological products, promised new medical
breakthroughs but also facilitated the explosion of pharmaceutical
patent thickets. 126 Pharmaceutical companies manufacture biologics by
harvesting material from genetically modified cell lines and purifying
that material through a complex and lengthy process. 127 Because
biologics are created from living material, which is sensitive to
environmental changes, the manufacturing process must be very
precise, or the end-product could be significantly altered. 128 Thus, for

121. Hacohen, supra note 118, at 481–82.
122. Examples of small-molecule drugs are the heartburn drugs, Prilosec and Nexium, and the
blood thinner, Plavix. Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 5.
123. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 99.
124. Id.; Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 6.
125. Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 9.
126. See id. at 3 (discussing different types of abusive tactics that pharmaceutical companies
have used in the small-molecule drug setting).
127. See id. at 5 (explaining the biologics process and that it began being explored in 1976 with
a breakthrough by Genentech, which found a way to genetically engineer DNA in living cells).
128. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 100.
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biologics, “the process is the product, and the product is the process.” 129
This fact allows pharmaceutical companies to “file patents on obscure
steps in the production and manufacturing process, or [various
formulations].” 130 Humira, for example, has more than thirty patents
on drug administration, more than twenty-five patents for its various
formulations, more than fifty patents on its manufacturing process, and
about twenty patents on the “delivery devices” that customers use to
inject Humira into their bodies. 131 The ability to legitimately patent
multiple features of one drug provided cover for pharmaceutical
companies to grow impenetrable patent thickets around a single drug
like Humira.
Another factor complicating the emergence of generic versions of
biologics is the fact that biologics cannot be precisely replicated. 132
Instead, biologic-drug manufacturers can only create “biosimilars”—a
biologic that is “highly similar” to an already approved biologic
“notwithstanding
minor
differences
in
clinically
inactive
components.” 133 The cost of developing a biosimilar version of a biologic
drug, up to $200 million, completely dwarfs the $2 million cost to
develop generic versions of small-molecule drugs. 134 Thus, the
enormous cost of developing biosimilars combined with the risk of
dealing with a patent thicket and potentially devastating monetary
damages for infringement can ward off biosimilar challengers.
Despite the high price tags for biologics development,
pharmaceutical companies have increasingly switched their focus from
inventing new small-molecule drugs to inventing new biologics, with
some planning to receive up to half of their revenues from biologic
drugs. 135 The pharmaceutical industry reaps multiple benefits from
such a switch: the average daily cost of a biologic far exceeds that of a

129. Dov Hirsch, Note, The Riddle of the Mysterious Patent Dance Wrapped in an Enigma: Is
the Patent Dance of the BPCIA Optional or Mandatory?, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 645, 652 (2017).
130. Mukherjee, supra note 4.
131. Id.
132. Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 3. Biologics cannot be precisely replicated because
each step in the production process can affect the living components in the biologics process. A
helpful analogy is to think of biologics creation like winemaking: even if wineries use the same
grapes to make the same type of wine, the wines can turn out very differently based on minor
differences in the process like when the grapes are harvested, whether they are crushed or pressed,
differences in fermentation, etc.
133. Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 104 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(A)).
134. Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 9.
135. JIE JACK LI, BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 172–73 (2014).
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small-molecule drug; 136 due to their complex nature, biologics provide
pharmaceutical companies with more opportunities to amass multiple
patents on a single drug; 137 and price erosion from the entry of
biosimilars is much less than that from the entry of generics. 138 Biologic
drugs also promise vast quality of life improvements for those with
autoimmune diseases, those with cancer, and other patients who
“previously had no available treatment options”—but only if consumers
can afford to use them. 139
C. The Evolution of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
As seen in earlier sections, the advent of biologics like Humira
has made the formation of patent thickets easier, and patent law both
incentivizes the formation of patent thickets and makes them very
difficult to effectively challenge. 140 Further, patent law relies on
markets to regulate the value of patented inventions, but inefficient
markets in the pharmaceutical industry have distorted the value of
drug patents. 141 Antitrust law aims to remedy inefficient markets by
“correct[ing] market failures brought about by lack of competition” and
by “disciplin[ing] activities that seek to limit [competition].” 142
Unfortunately for consumers, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which
provides antitrust immunity when parties petition the government for
action—including by seeking and enforcing patents—stands in the way
of antitrust law’s possible remedies for pharmaceutical market failures.
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine originated with the Supreme
Court case Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc. in 1961. 143 In Noerr, the Court held that the Sherman Act,
which prohibits monopolization attempts and agreements restraining
trade, cannot prohibit efforts to influence the passage or enforcement of
136. See Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 9 (noting that the average daily cost of a
biologic is $45 while the average daily cost of a small-molecule drug is $2).
137. See Wu & Cheng, supra note 21, at 155–56 (arguing that because the scope of each biologic
patent is smaller than that of small-molecule patent, companies tend to obtain more patents to
cover all the different aspects of the biologic).
138. See Carrier & Minniti III, supra note 64, at 10 (predicting that the entry of biosimilars
will not erode cost as much as the entry of small-molecule drugs because pharmaceutical
companies need to recoup the much greater development costs for biosimilars).
139. Alex Hyde, What Are Biologics?, BIOANALYSIS ZONE (May 13, 2020),
https://www.bioanalysis-zone.com/biologics-definition-applications/
[https://perma.cc/8FH82VG9].
140. See supra Sections I.A (discussing patent law) and I.B (discussing biologics).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68.
142. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO ST. L.J.
467, 475 (2015).
143. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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laws. 144 The Court reasoned that antitrust laws like the Sherman Act
could not interfere with the First Amendment right “to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.” 145 Therefore, antitrust laws
cannot prevent parties from attempting to get new laws passed or
attempting to enforce existing laws, even if the practical effect of such
efforts would cripple competitors. 146
A few years later, in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, the
Supreme Court extended Noerr antitrust immunity beyond the
legislative arena to acts seeking to influence executive action. 147 The
Court held that even “joint efforts” 148 attempting to instigate action by
executive officials would be shielded by Noerr, despite any
anticompetitive motives. 149 Finally, in California Motor, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the right to petition includes access to the courts
and administrative agencies and extended Noerr protection to such
proceedings. 150 In other words, Noerr protected the rights of parties to
file lawsuits or initiate administrative proceedings. 151 Thus, the NoerrPennington doctrine allows parties to use the processes of all three
branches of government to achieve anticompetitive effects while
immunized from antitrust liability. 152
A hypothetical may help illustrate how the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine operates in practice. Assume that Brand Name and Generic
are competitors in the pharmaceutical industry. Brand Name has
lobbied aggressively for legislation or regulations to be enacted that, in
effect, would target only Generic’s business. Brand Name’s express
intent is ensuring that Generic cannot create a generic competitor to
Brand Name’s marquis drug. Brand Name has also reported Generic to
144. Id. at 138; 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138.
146. See Noerr, 365 U.S. at 139 (“It is neither unusual nor illegal for people to seek action on
laws in the hope that they may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to
their competitors.”).
147. 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965) (“Joint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the
antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.”).
148. “Joint efforts,” or, in other words, an agreement between competitors, are one of the key
elements of Sherman Act § 1 violations. The involvement of two parties rather than one party is
one of the main distinguishing features between Sherman Act § 1 and § 2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1
(Combinations in restraint of trade are illegal.); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Independent attempts or acts of
monopolization are illegal.).
149. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
150. Cal. Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972).
151. Id.
152. See id. (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government.”).
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the FDA for safety violations, again with the express intent of delaying
Generic’s competing drug. Finally, when these efforts prove
unsuccessful, Brand Name sues Generic for patent infringement,
claiming that Generic’s new drug infringes upon Brand Name’s patent
for its marquis drug. Generic may, as part of its defense, bring a
counterclaim against Brand Name for Sherman Act antitrust violations
for attempted monopolization. Alternatively, Generic could bring its
own suit against Brand Name for Sherman Act antitrust violations.
Either way, in response, Brand Name can argue that the NoerrPennington doctrine immunized all of Brand Name’s actions, and
Generic’s claims should be dismissed. Under these circumstances,
Brand Name would likely get Generic’s claims dismissed even if Brand
Name brazenly and publicly declared its anticompetitive intentions for
its actions. Unless Generic can adequately plead that Brand Name’s
activities fall within the sham exception or one of the other exceptions
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, Generic’s claims will be dismissed. 153
As can be seen from this illustration, while Brand Name may be
the plaintiff in the original action, in a Noerr-Pennington context, the
roles will be reversed. Thus, this Note describes a party who brings an
antitrust claim as the “antitrust plaintiff” (even though the same party
may have been the defendant originally). On the other hand, an
“antitrust defendant” is a party who invokes Noerr-Pennington as a
defense. Consequently, the antitrust plaintiff has the burden of proving
that the sham exception applies to the antitrust defendant’s actions to
overcome Noerr-Pennington immunity and move past the pleadings.
D. Operation of the Sham Exception to Noerr-Pennington
As the Court set the foundation for the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine in Noerr, the Court simultaneously laid the groundwork for the
sham exception. In Noerr, the Court noted that “[t]here may be
situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be
justified.” 154

153. See Atwood, supra note 47, at 653 (“[T]he basic teaching of the Noerr/Pennington doctrine
is that petitioning the government . . . is immune from challenge under the antitrust
laws. . . . [But] [t]here are exceptions to this immunity principle.”).
154. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961) (emphasis
added).
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The Court first explicitly recognized a case coming within the
“sham” exception in California Motor. 155 In California Motor, a group of
interstate-highway carriers filed multiple petitions to hamper the
applications of in-state highway carriers for additional operating rights
or transfer of existing rights. 156 In response, the in-state carriers filed
an antitrust suit alleging that the interstate carriers conspired to
weaponize administrative and judicial proceedings against the in-state
carriers. 157 The Court noted that the interstate carriers “instituted the
proceedings and actions . . . with or without probable cause, and
regardless of the merits of the cases,” which implied that some of the
proceedings could have merit but overall still constituted a sham. 158
This is because “sham proceedings” could emerge as “a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims . . . which leads the factfinder to conclude
that the administrative and judicial processes have been abused.” 159 A
pattern of sham claims is problematic because numerous claims against
a party could effectively strip that party’s “meaningful access” to the
courts and agencies. 160 In essence, the party being petitioned against
cannot use the same governmental processes as the petitioner because
it is too busy fighting off sham petitions. 161
While the Noerr-Pennington doctrine holds that a petitioner’s
anticompetitive intent is irrelevant and still grants antitrust immunity
to the petitioner, California Motor used intent in its sham exception
analysis. 162 With respect to the sham exception, it is the intent to
deprive competitors of the use of governmental processes that
eviscerates Noerr-Pennington immunity, not a petitioner’s general
anticompetitive intent to harm its opponents. 163 This is because the
First Amendment petitioning right works both ways, and courts must
balance each party’s countervailing rights. 164 The Noerr-Pennington
doctrine protects the right of parties to use governmental processes to

155. 404 U.S. at 516.
156. Id. at 509.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 512.
159. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 512.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. (“[A] purpose or intent [to deprive competitors of meaningful access to the agencies
and courts], if shown, would be ‘to discourage and ultimately prevent the respondents from
invoking’ the processes of the administrative agencies and courts and thus fall within the [sham]
exception to Noerr.”).
164. See id. at 515 (“First Amendment rights may not be used as the means or the pretext for
achieving ‘substantive evils’ which the legislature has the power to control.”).
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petition. 165 But if those parties are using governmental processes to
stop competitors from petitioning, then the petitioners have violated
their competitors’ First Amendment rights, and Noerr-Pennington no
longer provides immunity to the petitioners. 166 The Court thus
concluded that if the alleged “pattern of baseless repetitive claims” in
the complaint proved true, then “a violation of the antitrust laws has
been established.” 167
Over twenty years later, the Court revisited the sham exception
in PRE. PRE involved a single lawsuit brought by motion picture
owners for copyright infringement against hotel owners. 168 The alleged
copyright infringement consisted of the hotel owners allowing guests to
rent and view videodiscs in their rooms. 169 The hotel owners
counterclaimed for antitrust violations, alleging that the copyright
infringement suit was “a mere sham that cloaked underlying acts of
monopolization and conspiracy to restrain trade.” 170 The Court held
that “an objectively reasonable effort to litigate cannot be sham
regardless of subjective intent.” 171 In coming to this conclusion, the PRE
Court reasoned that California Motor’s sham exception analysis
required courts to “separate[ ] objectively reasonable claims from ‘a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims.’ ” 172 Therefore, PRE emphasized
that the sham exception required an indispensable objective component
in discerning petitions as shams.
The PRE Court formulated a two-part test for drawing the line
between “objectively reasonable” claims and baseless claims that would
invoke the sham exception. 173 In step one, the court evaluates whether
a suit is “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant
could reasonably expect success on the merits.” 174 In a footnote, the
majority also clarified that “[a] winning lawsuit is by definition a
reasonable effort at petitioning for redress and therefore not a sham”;
in other words, a winning lawsuit cannot be “objectively baseless.” 175
165. See id. at 510 (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the
Government.”).
166. See id. at 512 (holding that if a petitioner is using governmental processes to discourage
its competitors from invoking governmental processes, the petitioner’s activities fall within the
sham exception and do not have Noerr-Pennington immunity).
167. Id. at 513, 515.
168. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 51–52 (1993).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 52.
171. Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 58 (quoting Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 513) (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 60–61.
174. Id. (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 60 n.5.
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Only if the suit is “objectively baseless” does the court move on to step
two and examine the litigant’s subjective motivation. 176 A subjective
motivation to use the governmental process itself (rather than the
outcome of the process) as an anticompetitive weapon would invoke the
sham exception. 177 Thus, while California Motor frontloaded its sham
exception inquiry to focus on the intent to weaponize government
process against competitors, PRE focused more on the objective nature
of the actions before reviewing the weaponization of government
processes.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the PRE judgment only, noted
that potential shams were more likely to fall through the cracks under
PRE’s two-part test than under California Motor’s analysis. In Justice
Stevens’s view, while California Motor viewed shams as a “pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims,” those claims did not necessarily have to be
“objectively baseless.” 178 He reasoned that “objectively unreasonable”
claims could also fit into a “pattern of baseless, repetitive claims.” 179
“Objectively unreasonable” claims are those where a plaintiff could
have “some reason to expect success on the merits but because of its
tremendous cost would not bother to achieve that result without the
benefit of collateral injuries imposed on its competitor by the legal
process alone.” 180 Justice Stevens argued that California Motor
provided room for “objectively unreasonable” claims to be included in
the sham exception because when analyzing a “pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims,” courts considered claims filed “regardless of the
merits.” 181 Therefore, the “objectively baseless” step in PRE may filter
out too many possible shams that would be “objectively unreasonable,”
but not “objectively baseless.”
II. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON SHAM EXCEPTION CIRCUIT SPLIT AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
As discussed above, California Motor has a less rigorous
standard for sham petitions of identifying a “pattern of baseless,
176. Id. at 60–61.
177. Id. Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence that an anticompetitive abuse of
governmental processes could be when litigation is initiated “to impose a collateral harm on the
defendant by, for example, impairing his credit, abusing the discovery process, or interfering with
his access to government agencies.” Id. at 68 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 67–68 (Stevens, J., concurring).
179. Id. at 67–69 (Stevens, J., concurring).
180. Id. at 68–69 (Stevens, J., concurring).
181. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972); see Pro. Real Est.
Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 73 (“Repetitive filings, some of which are successful and some unsuccessful,
may support an inference that the process is being misused.”).
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repetitive claims” filed “regardless of the merits” than PRE does. 182
PRE’s initial requirement that the petitions be “objectively baseless”
wherein no reasonable litigant had any reasonable expectation of
success on the merits is a high bar before even getting to the remainder
of the two-part test. 183 As Justice Stevens’s concurrence pointed out, the
gulf between California Motor’s and PRE’s standards for finding a sham
petition can lead to differing outcomes depending on which standard
the court applies. 184 The seeming conflict in the operation of the sham
exception in California Motor and PRE caused a circuit split. The Ninth
Circuit (later followed by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits)
reasoned that California Motor’s lower bar for shams should apply to a
pattern of meritless proceedings. In contrast, the First Circuit (later
followed by the Seventh Circuit) argued that PRE’s high bar for shams
should apply to all proceedings regardless of the number.
For ease of discussion, this analysis will refer to these disparate
treatments of the sham exception as the Ninth Circuit approach and
the First Circuit approach, respectively. Section A will first dissect and
reconcile the alleged conflict in the analyses of California Motor and
PRE. Section B will analyze the Ninth Circuit approach, and Section C
will analyze the First Circuit approach. Section D will integrate patent
thicket concerns into the analysis of the sham exception. Finally,
Section E will discuss the stare decisis considerations in reconciling
these decisions.
A. Reconciling the “Conflict” Between California Motor and PRE
While the differences in the analyses of the sham exception by
California Motor and PRE have been called conflicting, the cases may
be read in harmony. Importantly, the PRE majority did not explicitly
overrule California Motor and, in fact, relied on California Motor
throughout its analysis. 185 In PRE, the majority noted that “the sham
exception contains an indispensable objective component.” 186 The Court
further noted that “we have repeatedly reaffirmed that evidence of
anticompetitive intent or purpose alone cannot transform otherwise
legitimate activity into a sham.” 187 In contrast, California Motor
concentrated on the intent of petitioners (i.e., the antitrust defendants)
182. See supra text accompanying note 158–159.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 173–177 for a description of PRE’s two-step test for
the sham exception.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 178–179.
185. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 56–58 (1993).
186. Id. at 58.
187. Id. at 59.

2022]

A MACHETE FOR THE PATENT THICKET

303

to deprive their competitors (i.e., the antitrust plaintiffs) of the use of
governmental processes through their petitions. 188 But California
Motor contemplated a case with a pattern of petitions, not the single
petition at question in PRE. Patterns can be objectively observable
when there are multiple petitions. 189 Moreover, when multiple petitions
have effectively barred the petitioners’ competitors from governmental
processes, the competitors have objective evidence of the subjective
intent at question in California Motor. 190 Thus, if California Motor is
read to require a pattern of petitions to invoke the sham exception, not
just multiple petitions, California Motor and PRE are not in conflict on
PRE’s “objective criteria” requirement.
PRE is also noteworthy because it does not discuss in detail the
use of petitions to bar the antitrust plaintiff from meaningful access to
agencies and the judiciary. 191 In California Motor, the Court spent
considerable time discussing the potential blockage of access to
government processes. 192 Again, the fact that PRE deals only with a
single petition provides an explanation. It is difficult to conceive how
any single petition could effectively “bar” a competitor’s access to the
same court or agency in the way that California Motor’s pattern of
petitions allegedly did. 193 Thus, PRE did not consider the potential bar
of access to governmental processes because it was unnecessary to
consider in the context of that case.
Finally, PRE’s and California Motor’s differing standards on
whether “objectively baseless” or “objectively unreasonable” claims
invoke the sham exception can also be explained. PRE requires a
petition to be “objectively baseless” because when dealing with only one
petition, there is unlikely to be any objective evidence that the petition
is a sham except in the most egregious cases. 194 Only one sham petition
is probably insufficient to harm a competitor’s business to the point that
188. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972).
189. See id. at 513 (“One claim, which a court or agency may think baseless, may go unnoticed;
but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge . . . .”).
190. See Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 27, 728 F.3d 354,
364 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Of course, the subjective motive of the litigant and the objective merits of the
suit are relevant, but other signs of bad-faith litigation . . . may also be probative of an abuse of
the adjudicatory process.”).
191. See Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 57 (quoting California Motor’s language about
barring access to government processes, but not elaborating or discussing that element).
192. See, e.g., Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 511–12 (claiming that the antitrust defendant’s actions
essentially “usurp[ed] [the] decisionmaking process” by barring the antitrust plaintiffs’ meaningful
access to adjudicatory tribunals).
193. Cf. id. at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing the multiple allegations of abuse of the
administrative and judicial process by the antitrust defendants).
194. See Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 58 (noting that “the sham exception contains an
indispensable objective component”).
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it constitutes an antitrust violation. In contrast, in California Motor,
the pattern of petitions provides more data points for the court to
analyze and more possibilities for gathering objective evidence of a
sham. 195 For instance, the number of petitions could impose a financial
burden on the competitor that the court can quantify. 196 Multiple
petitions could also be used to effectively delay a competitor’s entry into
the market or to interfere with an important part of a competitor’s
business. 197 Thus, using a lower standard like “objectively
unreasonable” for a pattern of petitions makes sense.
B. The Ninth Circuit Approach: A Lower Bar for a Pattern of Sham
Petitions
In Posco, the first federal appellate court case to confront the
sham exception after PRE, the Ninth Circuit adopted a bifurcated
approach to reconciling California Motor and PRE. Posco involved a
non-unionized contractor, the antitrust plaintiff, who was awarded a
major construction contract. 198 Labor unions, the antitrust defendants,
allegedly filed automatic protests to requests for permits, filed multiple
lawsuits against the antitrust plaintiff, and engaged in lobbying
activities against the antitrust plaintiff. 199 The Ninth Circuit noted,
however, that the antitrust defendants prevailed in fifteen of the
twenty-nine suits that the antitrust plaintiff alleged to be part of the
pattern of sham petitions, “a batting average exceeding .500.” 200 The
Ninth Circuit held that the antitrust plaintiff had not met its burden of
showing that the alleged conduct was a sham because of the antitrust
defendants’ high win rate; thus, Noerr-Pennington immunized the
antitrust defendants’ conduct. 201

195. See Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 518 (Stewart, J., concurring) (describing the multiple factual
allegations behind the case).
196. See, e.g., Inserra Supermarkets, Inc. v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 240 F. Supp. 3d
299, 308 (D.N.J. 2017) (describing how the antitrust defendants’ petitions had delayed the
necessary government approvals that the antitrust plaintiff sought, which forced the antitrust
plaintiff to pay $100 thousand per month in rent for years before even being able to begin
development of its competing supermarket).
197. See, e.g., Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 167–70 (3d
Cir. 2015) (describing the antitrust defendants’ multiple petitions appealing the permits and
rezoning of a competitor trying to open a full-service supermarket in the same town when that
competitor would lose the real estate if it did not obtain all required permits within a certain time).
198. USS-Posco Indus. V. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 31 F.3d 800,
804 (9th Cir. 1994).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 811.
201. Id.
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Although the Ninth Circuit did not find that the conduct in Posco
fell within the sham exception (and thus vulnerable to antitrust
liability), the Ninth Circuit provided a new blueprint for courts to
reconcile California Motor and PRE. PRE’s two-step test applies in
situations where a single proceeding is at question and California
Motor applies in a series of proceedings. 202 The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that this bifurcated approach made sense because “the filing of a whole
series of lawsuits and other legal actions without regard to the merits
has far more serious implications than filing a single action, and can
serve as a very effective restraint on trade.” 203 Further, in a series of
lawsuits some may turn out to have merit by chance, but, as in
California Motor, the intent to impede competitors’ access to
governmental processes is the sham exception’s overriding
consideration. 204 The Posco Court reasoned that California Motor’s
dominant inquiry is “prospective”: Did the antitrust defendant make
the petitions “not out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances,
but . . . undertake[ ] [them] essentially for purposes of harassment”? 205
In evaluating this question, the Ninth Circuit focused on the antitrust
defendants’ win-loss ratio as discussed above. 206
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits all adopted similar
reasoning to Posco in reconciling California Motor and PRE. 207 These
later decisions explored the dimensions of California Motor’s pattern
test. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that PRE is “ill-fitted” for a series of
proceedings because a judge can more easily determine whether a
single claim is objectively baseless than review a parade of state and
administrative proceedings for baselessness. 208 The Fourth Circuit also
built on Posco’s formulation of the win-loss percentage to note that there
is “no particular win-loss percentage that a litigant must achieve” to
successfully invoke the sham exception. 209

202. Id. at 810–11.
203. Id. at 811; see supra text accompanying notes 200–201 (discussing the win-loss ratio in
Posco).
204. Posco, 31 F.3d at 811.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Vill. Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir.
2015) (“We agree with the approach to California Motor and Professional Real Estate that has been
adopted by the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.”); Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food &
Com. Workers Union Loc. 27, 728 F.3d 354, 363 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e agree with the distinction
adopted by our sister circuits.”); Primetime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 101
(2d Cir. 2000) (“[Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc.’s] two-step inquiry, however, applies to determining
‘whether a single action constitutes sham petitioning.’ ”) (quoting Posco, 31 F.3d at 811).
208. Waugh Chapel, 728 F.3d at 364.
209. Id. at 364–65.
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Both the Third and Fourth Circuits emphasized that courts
should also conduct a “holistic evaluation” to look for “other signs of
bad-faith litigation.” 210 The Third Circuit emphasized that when
considering evidence of bad faith, courts should look to “the magnitude
and nature of the collateral harm imposed on plaintiffs by defendants’
petitioning activity (e.g., abuses of the discovery process and
interference with access to governmental agencies).” 211 Bad-faith
indicators can be considered objective manifestations of a subjective
intent to usurp the government processes to harm competitors rather
than seeking an actual redress of grievances. 212
The Third Circuit provided a prime example of bad-faith
indicators. In Hanover 3201 Realty, the antitrust plaintiff entered into
an agreement to build a Wegmans supermarket on its property on the
condition that it secure all necessary permits and approvals before it
could break ground on the project. 213 The antitrust defendants,
ShopRite and its subsidiary, allegedly tried to prevent the entry of
Wegmans as a competitor supermarket in the town by filing numerous
administrative and court challenges to the antitrust plaintiff’s permit
applications. 214 In particular, the antitrust defendants submitted an
amended request for an adjudicatory hearing five months after their
initial request citing “new” proposed facts that the antitrust defendants
allegedly already knew at the time of their initial request. 215 The Third
Circuit reasoned that adding these “new” facts months later suggested
that the antitrust defendants were not interested in redressing any
grievances but in delaying the antitrust plaintiff from opening a
competing business. 216 Additionally, the antitrust defendants’
ecological consultant touted its ability to delay the antitrust plaintiff’s
environmental permit approval in an e-mail. 217 While the antitrust
defendants also had some successes, when the Third Circuit reviewed
the overall context of the antitrust defendants’ actions, it held that the
sham exception was applicable, and Noerr-Pennington did not
immunize the antitrust defendants’ conduct. 218 Thus, bad-faith
indicators, such as the ones on display in Hanover 3201 Realty, help
210. Id.; See Hanover 3201 Realty, 806 F.3d at 181 (citing Posco, 31 F.3d at 811).
211. Hanover 3201 Realty, 806 F.3d at 181 (citing Posco, 31 F.3d at 811).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 166.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 181.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 182.
218. Id. at 182–83 (“That Defendants have had some insignificant success along the way does
not alter the analysis when reviewing a pattern or series of proceedings.”).
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illustrate the abuse of government processes discussed in California
Motor.
One of the main concerns of the Ninth Circuit approach,
however, is that the California Motor analysis leaves many open
questions. For instance, what counts as a “petition”? When do a series
of petitions become a “pattern”? What counts as a win or a loss? Are
there any other pertinent criteria? Moreover, courts may need to sift
through a large number of proceedings to answer these questions. 219
Administrative proceedings may also add complexity since “the
presiding tribunal in those cases had no occasion to [document] the
baselessness of the suit because . . . it had no inkling that the action
[constituted part of] a possible campaign of sham litigation.” 220 While
the California Motor Court noted that it “may be a difficult line to
discern and draw,” courts cannot abdicate their duty to adjudicate these
cases because of their complexity. 221
C. The First Circuit Approach: The High Bar of PRE Always Applies
Unlike the Ninth Circuit approach, the First Circuit in Puerto
Rico Telephone Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC reasoned that PRE was not
necessarily limited to cases dealing with a single petition. 222 The First
Circuit noted that “[o]ne large lawsuit or intervention in an agency
proceeding can impose much more of a burden on a competitor than
might a series of smaller claims.” 223 Of course, while one large lawsuit
or agency proceeding could impose a huge burden on a competitor, a
sham petition under PRE is one that is “objectively baseless.” 224 If a
petition is “objectively baseless” such that “no reasonable litigant could
reasonably expect success on the merits,” then one sham proceeding
should not impose the type of burden that would cause significant
anticompetitive harm because the relevant court or agency should
swiftly dismiss such proceeding. 225

219. Waugh Chapel S., LLC v. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 27, 728 F.3d 354, 364
(4th Cir. 2013).
220. Id.
221. See 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); see also Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 75 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The difficulty of determining the true
purpose [of the antitrust defendant’s petitions] is great but no more so than in many other areas
of antitrust law.”).
222. 874 F.3d 767, 771 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[T]he court in [Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc.] wrote nothing
to suggest that its ruling would have been different had the defendant filed a series of objectively
reasonable suits.”).
223. Id. at 772.
224. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 60–61.
225. Id.
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Puerto Rico Telephone had another oddity that made it a unique
and less generally applicable case. In Puerto Rico Telephone, the district
court determined that each of the antitrust defendant’s filings was
objectively reasonable and that the antitrust plaintiff waived any
challenge to those findings. 226 Thus, the First Circuit confronted a case
with a series of filings, all of which were objectively reasonable as a
matter of law. 227 The First Circuit concluded that if every filing in a
large series of filings was objectively reasonable, then they failed to see
“how a jury could reasonably conclude that the party was filing petitions
‘regardless of the merits of the cases,’ ” as required by California
Motor. 228 Judge Barron’s concurrence further noted that the majority
opinion did not necessarily foreclose the approach taken by the other
circuits because the majority opinion relied “on a more record-based,
case-specific line of reasoning.” 229
Despite Judge Barron’s concurrence, the Seventh Circuit,
relying on Puerto Rico Telephone, explicitly rejected that California
Motor “provides a separate rubric to use whenever a ‘pattern’ of sham
filings is alleged.” 230 In U.S. Futures Exchange, L.L.C. v. Board of
Trade, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that “[t]he sham
exception is ‘extraordinarily narrow.’ ” 231 The Seventh Circuit noted
that the PRE Court draws its two-part test directly from the language
in California Motor: courts must “draw the ‘difficult line’ that separates
out objectively reasonable claims from patterns of ‘baseless, repetitive
claims’ before finding a sham.” 232 U.S. Futures Exchange dealt with an
alleged pattern of petitions in the legislative arena, however, not
judicial or administrative proceedings. 233 As the Seventh Circuit
reasoned, legislative petitions may be subject to a higher standard than
judicial petitions because “ ‘subjecting the same defendant to antitrust
liability because it engaged in numerous unsuccessful attempts’ to
petition a legislative body ‘would eviscerate the Petition Clause.’ ” 234
The ability to petition representatives to enact legislation is necessary
to the functioning of a representative democracy and forms the very

226.
227.
228.
(1972)).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

P.R. Tel., 874 F.3d at 769–70.
See id.
Id. at 772 (quoting Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512
Id. at 773 (Barron, J., concurring).
U.S. Futures Exch., L.L.C. v. Bd. of Trade, 953 F.3d 955, 964 (7th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 963.
Id. at 964 (quoting Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 512).
Id. at 963.
Id. (quoting Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1998)).
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foundation of the rights in the First Amendment’s Petition Clause. 235 In
comparison, the right to use courts and administrative proceedings to
hold others to account, while crucial, is necessarily more limited
because the government has to balance the countervailing rights of both
plaintiffs and defendants.
Neither the First nor Seventh Circuits addressed a case with
similar facts to California Motor, Posco, or the cases analyzed by the
other circuit courts. Both the First and Seventh Circuit opinions
rejecting a separate sham analysis under California Motor for a pattern
of petitions dealt with atypical situations. In the First Circuit, the
antitrust plaintiff acquiesced to the district court’s finding that all
petitions in question were objectively reasonable. 236 On the other hand,
in the Seventh Circuit, the antitrust claim dealt with legislative
petitions, not judicial or administrative petitions. 237 In fact, no circuit
court has required the PRE two-step test to be applied in a case that
resembles the facts of California Motor.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis contained two other
flaws that hamper its effectiveness. First, the Seventh Circuit claimed
that the First Circuit completely rejected the Ninth Circuit approach of
looking for patterns of sham cases. 238 The First Circuit’s decision,
however, rested its conclusion on much narrower grounds, as discussed
above. 239 Second, U.S. Futures Exchange also dealt with a single
proceeding, which meant that the California Motor analysis would
never have been appropriate in that case. 240 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s
rejection of the Ninth Circuit approach is arguably dicta. 241 Taken
together, these flaws undermine the persuasiveness of the Seventh
Circuit’s argument and the First Circuit approach.

235. See id. at 966 (“Proving sham petitioning in a legislative context like this is virtually
impossible.”); U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing citizens the right “to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances”); see also Cal. Motor, 404 U.S. at 510 (explaining that in a
representative democracy, “the whole concept of representation depends upon the ability of the
people to make their wishes known to their representatives”).
236. P.R. Tel. Co. v. San Juan Cable LLC, 874 F.3d 767, 769–70 (1st Cir. 2017).
237. U.S. Futures Exch., 953 F.3d at 963.
238. See id. at 964 (claiming that Puerto Rico Telephone rejected the notion of a separate rubric
for a pattern of petitions).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 226–229 (discussing the limited reach of Puerto Rico
Telephone’s holding).
240. See U.S. Futures Exch., 953 F.3d at 965–66 (“This case . . . involves a single legislative
proceeding within which Defendants made multiple efforts . . . regarding one overarching
issue. . . . [M]ultiple filings, submissions, or other efforts [do not] transform one lawsuit or
proceeding into many.”).
241. See id.
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D. Patent Thickets and the Sham Exception
Patent thickets pose several unique obstacles for plaintiffs
wishing to bring antitrust claims against patent holders under the
sham exception. If courts follow the First Circuit approach of analyzing
each petition in a vacuum, then patent holders could probably
successfully invoke the Noerr-Pennington doctrine every time. 242 First,
judicial economy would be implicated by the First Circuit approach to
patent thickets. Antitrust plaintiffs would need to bring separate
antitrust claims for each allegedly sham petition. 243 In re Humira,
decided by a district court in the Seventh Circuit, followed the First
Circuit approach and demonstrates how problematic this approach
might be. 244 If antitrust plaintiffs challenged all 247 patent
applications, eighteen IPRs, and nine patent infringement settlements,
the court would have to consider 274 separate claims and analyze each
independently under the PRE two-step test. 245
Second, no one claim standing on its own would likely withstand
antitrust scrutiny. For example, because patents restrict competition
by design, using one patent, even if invalidly granted, would probably
not be deemed as unduly hindering competition. 246 Moreover, when only
one patent is at issue, competitors could challenge the validity of such
patent through IPR or litigation and actually prevail. 247 Potential
plaintiffs do not need antitrust claims to challenge one patent; only
when a party aggregates an excessive number of patents do IPRs or
litigation become too risky to pursue. 248 The cumulative effect of the
patent thicket and aggressive patent infringement litigation effectively
bars competitors from the use of governmental processes, such as IPRs
and patent litigation, as California Motor warned.

242. See supra Section II.C (citing the Seventh Circuit’s description of the sham litigation as
“extraordinarily narrow”).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 76, 80 (explaining how each patent must be
invalidated separately even if they are derivative patents with minor differences stemming from
one continuation application).
244. See In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 830 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
245. See id. at 822, 824, 831 (detailing the petitions made by AbbVie in order to allegedly
protect AbbVie’s patent thicket for Humira).
246. See Carrier, supra note 46, at 768 (“[M]any acts undertaken by patentee monopolists or
agreements between patentees and licensees restrict competition by their very operation.”)
(emphasis added).
247. See supra Section I.A.3-4 (explaining the benefits and drawbacks of challenging patents
via IPRs or litigation).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 119–121 (describing the risks and financial outlay
required to challenge a patent thicket through IPRs or litigation and providing the Humira patent
thicket as a specific example).
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AbbVie’s patent strategy with Humira has shown how AbbVie
has been able to effectively bar Humira’s competitors from accessing
governmental processes to challenge the patent thicket around Humira.
Boehringer Ingelheim (“Boehringer”), one of the world’s largest
pharmaceutical companies, developed a Humira biosimilar called
Cyltezo, which obtained FDA approval in 2017. 249 In 2017 (after
Humira’s core patent on adalimumab had expired), AbbVie filed a
lawsuit against Boehringer claiming seventy-four instances of patent
infringement. 250 Boehringer fought AbbVie in court for two years, but
Boehringer eventually gave up and settled with AbbVie in May 2019. 251
Boehringer was the ninth company to settle patent litigation with
AbbVie over a Humira biosimilar. 252 In discussing its decision to settle
with AbbVie after protracted litigation, Boehringer cited “the inherent
unpredictability of litigation” and “the substantial costs . . . and
ongoing distraction to our business.” 253 Boehringer’s settlement after
two years of vigorously fighting AbbVie’s patent thicket and the myriad
other Humira biosimilar settlements illustrate how pharmaceutical
competitors cannot, or will not, effectively fight patent thickets using
available patent law tools.
Third, if the PRE Court’s reasoning that “[a] winning lawsuit is
by definition [objectively reasonable]” is extended to patent
applications, then the sham exception could be eviscerated with respect
to patents altogether. 254 Courts could reason that any patent
application that resulted in a granted patent is objectively reasonable
by virtue of the PTO’s grant. 255 This would mean that most patent
applications (and all patent thickets) would by default have NoerrPennington antitrust immunity. 256

249. AbbVie and Boehringer Ingelheim Settle Over Biosimilar Adalimumab, AJMC CTR. FOR
BIOSIMILARS, https://www.centerforbiosimilars.com/view/abbvie-and-boehringer-ingelheim-settleover-biosimilar-adalimumab (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) [https://perma.cc/W434-UPQH].
250. Mukherjee, supra note 4.
251. Colin Kellaher, AbbVie, Boehringer Settle U.S. Patent Dispute over Drug Humira, WALL
ST. J. (May 14, 2019, 12:24 P.M.), https://www.wsj.com/articles/abbvie-boehringer-settle-u-spatent-dispute-over-drug-humira11557851079?st=l34q18a498j0ich&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink [https://perma.cc/X3H2YN3T].
252. Mukherjee, supra note 4.
253. Id.
254. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 60 n.5 (1993).
255. Even if the patents were later invalidated, the fact that the PTO granted the patents in
the first place probably means that they don’t clear PRE’s high bar of being “objectively baseless”
such that no reasonable applicant would expect a patent to be granted. See id. (providing guidance
on which petitions are considered objectively reasonable).
256. See supra text accompanying note 152.
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The Ninth Circuit approach better addresses patent thicket
concerns outlined above. One antitrust claim could cover the entire
spectrum of alleged anticompetitive behavior, from patent applications
to patent infringement settlements. 257 And because the court is
analyzing a pattern of behavior for anticompetitive issues, the court can
spend less time reviewing each petition individually. Moreover, the
aggregation of the petitions can better show the anticompetitive nature
of the actions than reviewing each petition individually. As discussed
above, the Ninth Circuit approach still contains an objective component
(which the PRE Court argued was necessary to the sham exception
analysis) in calculating the win-loss ratio of the petitions. 258 Thus,
patent thickets like those in In re Humira are better suited for analysis
under the Ninth Circuit approach.
E. Stare Decisis Considerations
Finally, despite the reasoning of the First and Seventh Circuits,
the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule California Motor’s
precedent in PRE. 259 The doctrine of stare decisis should be considered
when discussing how to handle precedential cases like these. Stare
decisis stands for the presumption that precedent should be followed
unless the court has a compelling reason to overrule it. 260 The Supreme
Court has stated that “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.” 261 The PRE Court made multiple references to the
California Motor decision, but never stated that it was overruling
California Motor in whole or in part. 262 Stare decisis for the sham
exception requires lower courts to follow whichever Supreme Court
decision more closely resembles the facts of the case at hand or “directly

257. See, e.g., In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 822, 824, 831
(N.D. Ill. 2020) (describing the antitrust plaintiff’s allegations about AbbVie’s various patent
activities).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 189–190 (noting that requiring a “pattern” of sham
petitions would provide multiple data points that can be objectively observed).
259. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 56–58.
260. Amy L. Padden, Note, Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision’s
Vote, Age, and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis after Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1689, 1689 (1994).
261. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989)
(emphasis added).
262. Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 56–58.
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controls.” 263 Thus, the lower courts should not assume that the test
announced in PRE has replaced the California Motor analysis. The
Ninth Circuit’s bifurcated approach best respects the bedrock principle
of stare decisis as articulated by the Supreme Court by allowing both
the California Motor and PRE analyses to stand.
Actavis provides another stare decisis consideration. In Actavis,
the Supreme Court specifically rejected granting antitrust immunity to
patent owners who remained within the “scope of [their] patent.” 264 Yet,
the In re Humira Court revived this rejected reasoning by holding that
only one valid patent was needed to immunize AbbVie from antitrust
scrutiny. 265 To extend the logic of that opinion, AbbVie would thus be
immunized from antitrust liability no matter how many illegitimate
patents it obtained as long as Humira had one core valid patent at the
center of the patent thicket. The anticompetitive harm allegedly
perpetrated by AbbVie, however, did not stem from a single patent. 266
The accumulation of a host of patents caused the anticompetitive harm
because competitors could not even discover if a valid patent did exist
in the midst of the patent thicket. If pharmaceutical companies could
obtain one valid patent to immunize a range of illegitimate and
anticompetitive patents, Actavis’s rejection of antitrust immunity based
on simply being a patent owner would be eviscerated.
Additionally, the First Circuit approach of applying the two-step
PRE test to each individual patent proceeding in a vacuum makes it
impossible for a challenger to prevail because patents have a
presumption of validity, making them “objectively reasonable.” 267 Such
an approach again conflicts with Actavis because patent owners would
essentially be granted antitrust immunity by virtue of simply obtaining

263. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484 (holding that lower courts must follow the
Supreme Court precedent with the most similar facts and let the Supreme Court overrule its own
decisions expressly).
264. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 141 (2013) (rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
that reverse payment settlements were “immune from antitrust attack so long as its
anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent”).
265. See In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
(“[I]t only takes one valid, infringed patent to render all the rest—whether invalid, infringed, or
not—irrelevant for purposes of cause-in-fact analysis.”).
266. For instance, if AbbVie only had one or two valid patents on Humira and no patent
thicket, AbbVie’s competitors could theoretically figure out how to “patent around” AbbVie’s valid
patents and, thus, bring a competing drug into the market earlier. Alternately, if Humira had
fewer patents, then competitors could better analyze which patents were ripe for attack and could
better bear the risk of attempting to invalidate those patents.
267. See Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc., 508 U.S. at 60–61 (noting that the first step in the PRE test
requires the antitrust plaintiff “to disprove the challenged lawsuit’s legal viability” before moving
on to the rest of the test).
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a patent. 268 In Actavis and its rejection of scope-of-the-patent antitrust
immunity, the Court explicitly opened the door for possible antitrust
scrutiny of patent proceedings. 269 Thus, the Ninth Circuit approach
better adheres to Actavis because that inquiry acknowledges that some
of the patent proceedings could have merit but still allows for some
antitrust scrutiny. 270
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PATENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE
CALIFORNIA MOTOR PATTERN ANALYSIS
This Note proposes adopting a modified version of the bifurcated
approach to the sham exception used by the majority of circuits. Section
A proposes some general updates to the California Motor pattern
analysis to ensure consistency of analysis in the lower courts. Section B
provides a framework to analyze patent law-specific proceedings under
the California Motor pattern analysis. This will provide specific
guidance for plaintiffs seeking to challenge pharmaceutical patent
thickets and other common tactics of the pharmaceutical industry
under the sham exception. Finally, Section C discusses the implications
of and counterarguments to this solution.
The main benefit of this solution is that it provides a viable
alternative to attacking patent thickets outside of patent law, which
has proved incapable of addressing the patent thicket problem. With
the sham exception, challengers can attack the entire patent thicket at
once instead of making piecemeal hacks at each patent through IPRs or
expensive, lengthy litigation. This is because the sham exception
analysis under California Motor focuses on the overall pattern of
anticompetitive behavior. Using the sham exception to attack
pharmaceutical patent thickets, if successful, would disincentivize
pharmaceutical companies from creating these thickets in the first
place to avoid potential antitrust liability. Reduced patent thickets
would also lower burdens on the PTO, allow generics and biosimilars to
enter the market sooner, and reduce drug prices for consumers, due to
the increased market competition.
268. See 570 U.S. at 141 (rejecting antitrust law immunity when a patent owner’s actions fell
within the scope of the patent).
269. See id. (holding that reverse payment settlements made by patent owners can sometimes
violate antitrust laws); USS-Posco Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
31 F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The inquiry in such cases is prospective: Were the legal filings
made, not out of a genuine interest in redressing grievances, but as part of a pattern or practice of
successive filings undertaken essentially for purposes of harassment?”).
270. See supra Section II.B (describing the Ninth Circuit approach of applying the California
Motor sham analysis in cases where there was a pattern of filings made “without regard to the
merits”).
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A. General Proposed Updates to the California Motor Pattern Analysis
As noted above, this Note proposes a modified version of the
Ninth Circuit’s bifurcated approach to the sham exception analysis.
First, if only a single petition is at question, then the PRE two-step test
should be used to analyze the sham exception claim. If, however, a case
involves multiple petitions, instead of going straight to California
Motor, the court should determine whether the petitions constitute a
“pattern.” If the court determines that the multiple petitions constitute
a pattern, then the court would proceed under California Motor’s sham
exception analysis. On the other hand, if the court determines that the
multiple petitions do not constitute a pattern, then the court would
proceed to analyze the petitions under PRE’s more exacting standard.
When analyzing multiple petitions, one way courts can discover
a pattern is to see if the petitions take a logical progression. Typically,
if people study a section of a pattern, they can then predict the next
steps in that pattern. Similarly, if the antitrust defendant’s petitions
follow a predictable path or illustrate progress towards a specific
anticompetitive goal, then the petitions probably constitute a pattern.
Livingston Downs Racing Association v. Jefferson Downs Corp.
illustrates this point. 271 In that case, the antitrust plaintiff attempted
to open a rival racetrack for horse racing and betting operations; in
order to do this, the antitrust plaintiff had to obtain licenses from the
state racing commission and secure voter approval for the racetrack in
a referendum election. 272 The antitrust defendants wanted to deter the
rival racetrack from becoming operational and followed a predictable
course of action to stymie the antitrust plaintiff every step of the way:
lobbying the racing commission to deny the antitrust plaintiff the
required licenses; “campaigning against the new racetrack in the
referendum election; filing lawsuits contesting the legitimacy of both
the referendum election and the [antitrust plaintiff’s licenses]; and
intervening in the various lawsuits [the antitrust plaintiff] filed in an
attempt to obtain [the required licenses].” 273 The long delays caused by
the antitrust defendants’ lobbying and legal challenges eventually
caused the antitrust plaintiff’s financing to fall through, “scuttling their
plans entirely.” 274 As can be seen here, the antitrust defendants

271. See 192 F. Supp. 2d 519 (M.D. La. 2001) (noting that repeated petitions in state courts,
apparent temporizing, and overzealous pursuit of certain actions gave rise to the inference that
the defendants were using the legal process as a weapon).
272. Id. at 522.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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followed a logical progression to challenge the rival racetrack’s opening
through every possible avenue, evidencing a pattern of petitions.
Finally, if the court determines that the multiple petitions in
question constitute a pattern, the court should holistically examine the
petitions, the parties’ circumstances, and any bad faith indicators to
determine whether the pattern constitutes a sham. A host of bad faith
indicators could overcome minor successes, or a lack of bad faith
indicators may require more serious successes to be deemed a sham.
Other indicators like actual collateral harm suffered as a result of the
antitrust defendant’s petitions could also be a strong factor in
determining that the actions should be deemed a sham.
B. Patent Law Considerations Under the California Motor Pattern
Analysis
The unique and complex nature of patent law and proceedings
makes analysis under the California Motor framework difficult,
particularly with respect to the threshold questions described above.
This section provides guidance on how to analyze patent applications,
IPRs, and reverse payment settlements in order to ensure consistent
results under California Motor.
Patent applications pose an interesting issue under the
California Motor pattern analysis. The term “patent applications” can
include brand new patent applications as well as continuations, which
tie back to previous patent applications. 275 One could make an
argument that continuations should be lumped together with the
original application and all counted as one petition. But continuations
result in a restarting of the patent prosecution process and a full
reconsideration of the merits of the application by the government
examiners. 276 Thus, each continuation should be treated as a separate
petition. This approach could also help to ease the burden on the PTO
by encouraging inventors to file higher quality applications early on and
discouraging them from filing multiple continuations on the same
claims. 277
Next, IPRs contain two major PTAB decisions that need to be
analyzed: (1) the initial institution decision and (2) the final written
decision about the patent’s validity. The final written decision should
275. See supra Section I.A.1 (explaining the difference between new patent applications,
continuation applications, and RCEs).
276. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 71, at 625 n.46 (explaining the consequences of
filing either a continuation application or an RCE).
277. See id. at 616 (noting that PTO’s backlog contained over 600,000 applications of which
close to 40% were repeat filings).
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count as a win or a loss because both parties have had a chance to argue
their case, present evidence, and have a tribunal weigh the arguments
before coming to a decision, which can be appealed. 278 Further, an
invalidity decision under an IPR has the same outcome as an invalidity
decision in litigation—the patent is cancelled. 279 On the other hand, this
Note proposes that institution decisions should not be counted as a win
or a loss for the reasons provided below.
While the institution decision can end the IPR proceeding, the
institution decision is not the final word on a patent’s validity. The
patent can still be challenged in district court litigation on other
grounds or even be the subject of an IPR by a totally new party. 280
Moreover, before the PTAB institutes an IPR proceeding, the
challenger, not the patent owner, has the burden of proof to establish
“a reasonable likelihood that the [challenger] would prevail.” 281 Of
course, patent owners also do not have the presumption of validity in
IPRs that they have in litigation, but the thumb is still on the scale for
the patent owners prior to institution. 282 When Posco first established
the win-loss ratio as a criterion under the California Motor analysis,
the Ninth Circuit specified as part of its calculation that the wins were
decisive because the plaintiff (i.e., the antitrust defendant) had the
burden of proof and still won. 283 Because patent owners do not bear the
burden of proof before institution in IPRs, institution decisions should
not be used in the win-loss ratio.
In re Humira provides an example of why using institution
decisions in a calculation is problematic. Although the court in In re
Humira held that PRE was the proper test, the court reasoned that
AbbVie would have prevailed under California Motor too. 284 The court
used AbbVie’s record in the IPRs as partial evidence for this
proposition. 285 Challengers filed eighteen total IPR petitions on various
Humira patents. 286 Of these, all five that made it past institution
resulted in losses for AbbVie (the PTAB found three patents invalid and
278. See supra Section I.A.2 (describing IPR procedures).
279. On the contrary, if a patent is found valid in a final written decision, then the petitioner
is estopped from challenging the patent in court on any grounds that it could have raised in the
IPR. Love et al., supra note 50, at 102.
280. Id.
281. Dubis, supra note 87, at 116 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 314(a)).
282. Cohen, supra note 43, at 15.
283. USS-Posco Indus. v. Contra Costa Cnty. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 31
F.3d 800, 811 (9th Cir. 1994).
284. See In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 830 (N.D. Ill. 2020)
(reasoning that the claim of sham petitioning would not succeed in other circuits, including the
Ninth Circuit, which uses the California Motor test).
285. Id. at 831.
286. Id.
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AbbVie terminated the other two patents after institution). 287 The
PTAB declined to institute the other thirteen petitions, which the court
counted as wins for AbbVie. 288 By the court’s calculation, AbbVie won
thirteen out of eighteen petitions, a success rate of 72.2%. 289 Since
AbbVie did not succeed even once on the merits of its patents during
eighteen IPRs and all challenges that proceeded to a decision on the
merits resulted in losses for AbbVie, immunizing AbbVie from antitrust
liability on the basis of that record seems misguided at best.
Finally, although settlements normally count as wins for the
antitrust defendant, this Note proposes that reverse payment
settlement agreements should be counted as losses. In Catch Curve, Inc.
v. Venali, Inc., the court noted that patent owners usually seek
injunctions, damages, license fees, or some combination thereof in
patent litigation. 290 Thus, when Catch Curve, as the patent owner,
settled its suits and received license fees, these settlements counted as
wins in the sham analysis because the patent owner received one of the
outcomes that it was seeking through the litigation. 291 Reverse payment
settlements, of course, reverse the traditional flow of payments. 292 A
patent owner launching patent infringement litigation against a
challenger could have sought an injunction or license fees in court, but
instead pays a competitor not to compete. This patent owner does not
end up with a settlement in its favor but is ostensibly worse off than
before it initiated the lawsuit. Counting such a settlement as a win is
illogical. And if such settlements count as wins, pharmaceutical
companies would have even greater incentives to game potential winloss scenarios by paying off all challengers in settlements.
Counting reverse payment settlements as losses would also
follow the Actavis precedent. The Supreme Court noted the
anticompetitive effects that reverse payment settlements could have in
practice. 293 The Court refused to create a per se rule making all reverse
payment settlements unlawful, and this approach would similarly not
rule out such settlements. 294 Parties could still enter into such
settlements, but each reverse payment settlement would increase their
antitrust liability risk. This approach would encourage pharmaceutical
companies not to enter into (or at least to limit) such agreements to
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id.
Id.
Id.
No. CV 05-04820 (AJWx), 2008 WL 11334024, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008).
Id.
See supra Section I.A.3 (describing reverse payment settlement agreements).
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 153–54 (2013).
Id. at 158–59.
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avoid creating a record of losses to be used against them in potential
Noerr-Pennington cases.
C. Implications and Counterarguments
If AbbVie can brazenly exploit the patent law system with its
Humira patent thicket, other pharmaceutical companies and industries
may follow suit and create their own patent thickets. 295 A proliferation
of patent thickets would result in a reduction in innovation, higher costs
to consumers, and a crushing burden on the PTO. Moreover, if
companies realize that they have virtual immunity to antitrust laws
because the sham exception is nearly impossible to invoke, their
anticompetitive behavior will worsen.
Pharmaceutical companies argue that these patent law tactics
are needed because biologic drugs cost hundreds of millions of dollars
to develop, and they need to recoup these costs. 296 Pharmaceutical
companies, however, recoup their research and development costs in a
myriad of ways through taxpayer funding. For instance, the U.S.
government, through the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), “play[s]
a very major role in the early stages of almost every drug that gets
developed and approved by the [FDA].” 297 Government funded research
contributed to the development of “all 210 new drugs approved by the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration between 2010 and 2016.” 298 Yet,
the government usually does not demand any ownership rights as a
requirement for funding research, which leaves pharmaceutical
companies to take the windfall. 299
Taxpayers also help fund the development of new drugs through
multiple tax incentives. The tax code provides tax credits for research
and development, which includes credits available to all companies and

295. See, e.g., J. Peter Paredes, Written Description Requirement in Nanotechnology: Clearing
a Patent Thicket?, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 489, 490 (2006) (warning that a growing
patent thicket in nanotechnology could delay the commercialization or development of
nanotechnology); see also Silbersher, supra note 51 (“Other . . . pharmaceutical companies are
surely watching [Boehringer’s settlement with AbbVie]. It is now a no-brainer to follow AbbVie’s
patent plan . . . for Humira. Namely, if you’re launching a biologic drug, cover it with as many
patents as possible. . . . Pursue lots of overlapping patents with barely distinguishable
inventions.”).
296. See supra Section I.B (discussing the intricacies of biologic drug development).
297. David E. Mitchell, Opinion, Taxpayers Fund Research and Drug Companies Make a
Fortune, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/24/opinion/coronavirusvaccine-cost-pfizer-moderna.html?smid=url-share [https://perma.cc/CZ94-SVGN].
298. Id.
299. Id.
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credits specifically for pharmaceutical companies. 300 For any research
and development costs that pharmaceutical companies cannot recoup
through tax credits, the tax code also allows companies to deduct
research and development expenditures as business expenses. 301
Taxpayers also subsidize the high costs of biologics through
Medicare and Medicaid spending on these drugs. For example in 2016,
Medicare and Medicaid paid a total of $3.3 billion for Humira alone,
which accounted for about 31% of Humira’s total U.S. sales in that
year. 302 Medicare and Medicaid spending increases the demand for
prescription drugs, which in turn encourages pharmaceutical
companies to develop new drugs. 303 Thus, Medicare and Medicaid
spending helps subsidize pharmaceutical company profits (and
indirectly fund new research and development) through its spending on
prescription drugs.
Additionally, despite the various research and development
support that large pharmaceutical companies receive and their
astronomical drug prices, it is small pharmaceutical companies that are
mostly responsible for new drug development. 304 Small drug companies
developed over 70% of the nearly three thousand drugs in phase III
clinical trials. 305 Perhaps more shocking, “[s]ince 2009, about one-third
of the new drugs approved by the [FDA] have been developed by
pharmaceutical firms with annual revenues of less than $100
million.” 306 Meanwhile, large pharmaceutical companies like AbbVie
only spend a fraction of their revenues from blockbuster drugs like
Humira on research and development. Case in point: in 2018, AbbVie
spent only $5.1 billion on research and development, but earned $19.9
billion in worldwide net revenues from Humira alone in the same
year. 307 Studies have also indicated that “[i]ncreases in pharmaceutical
industry competition have been found to increase firms’ R&D
spending.” 308 This implies that pharmaceutical companies’ dire

300. CONG. BUDGET OFF., RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
20 (2021), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-04/57025-Rx-RnD.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH3A6KMK].
301. Id.
302. INITIATIVE FOR MEDICINES, ACCESS AND KNOWLEDGE, OVERPATENTED, OVERPRICED
SPECIAL EDITION: HUMIRA 6 (2020), https://www.i-mak.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/imak.humira.report.3.final-REVISED-2020-10-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U5K-68AD].
303. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 300, at 2.
304. “Small” is a relative term here. The Congressional Budget Office defined small drug
companies as “those with annual revenues of less than $500 million.” Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. (emphasis added).
307. Mukherjee, supra note 4; AbbVie Inc., supra note 5, at 31.
308. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 300, at 4 (emphasis added).

2022]

A MACHETE FOR THE PATENT THICKET

321

warnings about the necessity of patent thickets to fund research may
be overblown.
Pharmaceutical companies also argue that FDA approval
requirements significantly cut into the effective life of patents, which
means that without extending the patent terms, pharmaceutical
companies’ patent exclusivity may not last long enough to recoup their
development costs. 309 The answer to this problem is not, however,
allowing the industry to create an end run around the patent system. If
pharmaceutical companies can circumvent patent terms, then as
rational actors, they will put most of their investments toward
innovation in creating new patents and extending the patent terms for
their existing pharmaceuticals rather than innovating new drugs. Why
spend hundreds of millions of dollars developing a new biologic that
may not pass clinical trials when pharmaceutical companies can focus
on extending the exclusivity of an already approved and profitable
drug? Indeed, AbbVie provides a prime example of this behavior with
its Humira patents. AbbVie filed nearly 50% of its Humira patent
applications from 2014 onwards—only two years or less before the
original Humira patent expired. 310 Allowing patent thickets to
proliferate perverts patent law’s normal innovation incentives to the
public’s detriment. Antitrust liability could ensure that pharmaceutical
companies continue to innovate and create new drugs.
Finally, allowing the possibility for Noerr-Pennington immunity
to be pierced in the case of abusive patent tactics will not ensure victory
for antitrust plaintiffs against pharmaceutical companies. 311 Successful
invocation of the sham exception will allow antitrust plaintiffs the
opportunity to develop their cases and move them beyond the motion to
dismiss stage. 312 Antitrust plaintiffs, however, still need to be able to
prove their case, and this is no mean feat. 313 The sham exception can
309. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (explaining how patent terms can be effectively
shortened because the patent term starts running at the date of the application and not when the
patent is issued or when the drugs are actually approved by the FDA).
310. INITIATIVE FOR MEDICINES, ACCESS AND KNOWLEDGE, supra note 302, at 4.
311. See Pro. Real Est. Invs., Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61 (1993)
(“Proof of a sham merely deprives the defendant of immunity; it does not relieve the plaintiff of
the obligation to establish all other elements of his claim.”).
312. E.g., In re Humira (Adalimumab) Antitrust Litig., 465 F. Supp. 3d 811, 853 (N.D. Ill.
2020) (granting defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).
313. See Daniel E. Rauch, Sherman’s Missing “Supplement”: Prosecutorial Capacity, Agency
Incentives, and the False Dawn of Antitrust Federalism, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 172, 193 (2020)
(“Antitrust prosecutions are famously resource-intensive, lasting years and costing substantial
amounts of money.”); William Kolasky, Reinvigorating Antitrust Enforcement in the United States:
A Proposal, 22 ANTITRUST 85, 85 (2008) (“It has been more than fifteen years since the Supreme
Court last decided an antitrust case in favor of a plaintiff. Over this fifteen-year period, plaintiffs
have gone 0-for-16, with not a single plaintiff winning an antitrust case in the Supreme Court
since the first George Bush was president.”).
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make antitrust scrutiny of pharmaceutical patent thickets possible.
Moreover, the specter of antitrust liability may be enough to incentivize
pharmaceutical companies to change their ways without the
intervention of litigation or legislation. Although at the time of writing,
Congress has recently unveiled new legislation to combat the drug
pricing problem, the passage, contents, and potential impact of such
legislation on drug prices remains uncertain. 314 Given that Congress
has tried and failed to pass drug pricing legislation under both
Republican and Democratic leadership, allowing pharmaceutical
companies to face antitrust liability by piercing Noerr-Pennington
immunity may still be the best hope for lower drug prices. 315
CONCLUSION
What this technical discussion of the science of biologics, the ins
and outs of patent law, and their intersection with antitrust law leaves
out is the human cost of outrageous drug pricing. Biologics have
amazing therapeutic potential because they often treat chronic, painful
autoimmune diseases or cancer that may not be treatable with
traditional small-molecule drugs. But consumers are often left to choose
between relief from a crippling disease or paying the bills. One piece of
testimony during a recent Congressional hearing on AbbVie’s pricing
practices for Humira underscores the stakes of this battle:
[Humira] costs more than my car payment. More than my business insurance. More than
my food bill each month. But I made the decision to suck it up and pay because the drug
worked. But after months of successful pain and symptom management on
Humira, . . . AbbVie raised the price [and] [m]y new monthly payment was going to be
almost $1,100 a month. I simply could not afford it any longer. . . . It was already too
expensive for me at $750 per month. I couldn’t afford the 40% price hike. 316

Pharmaceutical companies’ exploitation of patent law to amass
impenetrable patent thickets around a single drug like Humira to
314. Jonathan Weisman & Emily Cochrane, Democrats Add Drug Cost Curbs to Social Policy
Plan, Pushing for Vote, N.Y. Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/02/us/politics/prescriptiondrug-prices-medicare.html?smid=url-share (last updated Nov. 6, 2021) [https://perma.cc/S9F2HQG3] (describing the contents of the most recent version of the drug pricing bill unveiled in
November 2021). Even if this legislation passes, the effect on drug pricing may be modest without
other levers like antitrust liability pressuring pharmaceutical companies to reasonably price their
products.
315. See, e.g., Paige Winfield Cunningham, The Health 202: Congress Failed to Pass a Drug
Pricing Overhaul. So It Set Another Deadline., WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-health-202/2019/12/17/the-health202-congress-failed-to-pass-a-drug-pricing-overhaul-so-it-set-anotherdeadline/5df7c57a88e0fa32a5140777/ [https://perma.cc/L79H-KJQC] (describing how Congress
failed to pass major legislation to lower drug prices in 2019 but set another deadline in May 2020
to get the legislation passed).
316. DRUG PRICING INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at 15–16.

2022]

A MACHETE FOR THE PATENT THICKET

323

artificially extend their monopoly comes at the expense of American
consumers. The pharmaceutical industry’s shift to biologic drugs, which
are more complex and already lend themselves to multiple patents for
a single drug, will aid in this strategy. With skyrocketing price tags to
develop new biosimilars followed by expensive, lengthy, and uncertain
patent infringement lawsuits, pharmaceutical competitors will
probably not push cheaper biosimilar alternatives forward. Patent law
has proved to be ill-suited to the challenge of hacking through these
patent thickets, providing a scalpel when consumers need a machete.
Thus, consumers need antitrust law to step into the void. Potential
plaintiffs, however, must overcome the Noerr-Pennington doctrine in
order to wield antitrust law in these circumstances. Use of the narrow
sham exception to Noerr-Pennington may be the best solution to fight
pharmaceutical companies’ abuse of the patent system.
For the sham exception to be an effective “machete” to hack
through the patent thicket, the sham exception circuit split needs to be
resolved. The Ninth Circuit approach to the sham exception reconciled
California Motor and PRE by reasoning that PRE’s two-part test only
applied in cases involving a single petition and California Motor’s looser
standard applied to cases with multiple petitions. In contrast, the First
Circuit approach to the sham exception argued that the PRE two-part
test applied in all situations.
This Note proposes adopting a modified version of the Ninth
Circuit approach and proposes a general framework for analyzing
patent proceedings under the California Motor pattern analysis. This
solution strikes the balance between protecting parties’ First
Amendment petitioning right and discouraging abuse of governmental
processes for anticompetitive effect, particularly in patent law. If
successful, antitrust challenges can lead to a quicker market entry for
biosimilar competitors, driving down biologic prices and allowing more
people to benefit from these life-altering drugs.
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